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INTRODUCTION
Suppose A allows B to borrow a ring valued at $50. B, now a
precarious possessor 1 of the ring, sells the ring for $50 to C, who is
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unaware that B did not own the ring. Louisiana law provides two potential
outcomes for this scenario: (1) A retains ownership of the ring, and C is
awarded damages from B; or (2) C obtains ownership of the ring, and A is
awarded damages from B. 2 At first glance, both solutions appear just and
equal, but tensions arise between the possible outcomes when B disappears
or becomes insolvent. 3
Suppose instead that A leases B a piece of heavy equipment valued at
$100,000. B, again a precarious possessor of the heavy equipment, sells
the equipment for $100,000 to C, who is unaware that B did not own the
equipment. Further, suppose that B flees after the sale to C and cannot be
located. Under Louisiana law, B’s disappearance will leave one party
without a remedy. If A is awarded ownership of the equipment, then C will
not recover damages from B; if C is awarded ownership of the equipment,
then A will not recover damages from B. In an attempt to avoid
nonrecovery from an absent B, both A and C will seek ownership of the
heavy equipment. Thus, the question becomes whether A, the original
owner, or C, the good faith purchaser, should be protected under Louisiana
law and awarded ownership of the valuable object. 4
The above situations illustrate a tension between two competing
purposes of Louisiana law of sales, namely, the protection of security of

1. “The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on
behalf of the owner or possessor is precarious possession.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 3437 (2021). The class of precarious possessors includes lessees, pledgees,
borrowers, mandataries, tutors, curators, and depositaries. A. N. Yiannopoulos,
Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 553 (1991).
2. The two possible solutions are explained as follows:
[I]n general, when a seller has sold a movable thing that the seller did
not own and did not have the right to sell, the true owner is not divested
of ownership and may recover the thing from the buyer. The buyer, in
turn, may have recourse against the seller in the form of an action for
damages. . . . The protection of the true owner at the expense of a
purchaser from one who did not own the thing sold is not absolute.
Exceptions are made to the general rule in order to protect innocent
purchasers and to promote the stability of commerce.
MELISSA T. LONEGRASS, SANDI VARNADO & CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, SALE,
LEASE, AND ADVANCED OBLIGATIONS 88 (2019).
3. See generally La. Lift & Equip., Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1999).
4. For purposes of this hypothetical, C is a good faith purchaser because he
did not know, nor should he have known, that B was not the owner of the
equipment. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 523 (2021); see also discussion infra
Section I.D.1.

1224

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

ownership and the protection of security of transaction. 5 In the above
situations, A will assert that there should be security of ownership—that
his right of ownership of the ring or equipment is not lost through B’s
misdeeds. 6 On the contrary, C will advocate for security of transaction—
that he is entitled to the ownership of the ring or equipment created through
his transaction with B. 7 The Louisiana legislature must resolve the tension
between the competing interests of A and C by setting forth clear
circumstances under which one security will be protected at the expense
of the other. 8 Plainly stated, the law must choose when to protect A, the
original owner, and when to protect C, the good faith purchaser.
Historically, Louisiana law afforded blanket protection to original
owners. 9 Louisiana law traditionally barred the sale of goods by a
nonowner to any purchaser, regardless of whether that purchaser was in
good faith. 10 In response to the Code’s blanket protection of ownership,
Louisiana courts began to occasionally award ownership to good faith
purchasers instead of the true owners. 11 In doing this, the courts
sidestepped the Code’s protection of ownership and instead promoted the
security of transaction in certain situations. 12 The courts’ protection of
good faith purchasers was achieved through the introduction of common
law principles through jurisprudential rules, which was heavily criticized
as a “judicial disregard” for Louisiana’s civil law tradition.13 In response,
5. DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 7:1, in 24
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2020).
6. Mitchell Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La
Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 591 (1932).
7. Id.
8. See generally id.
9. Lindsay Ellis, Transfer of Movables by Non-Owners, 55 TUL. L. REV.
145, 145 (1980).
10. “The sale of a thing belonging to another person is null; it may give rise
to damages, when the buyer knew not that the thing belonged to another person.”
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (1870).
11. Marie Breaux Stroud, The Sale of a Movable Belonging to Another: A
Code in Search of a Solution, 4 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 41, 42 (1988) (citing S.
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 90–94, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed.
1975)). For an illustration of the Louisiana courts’ protection of transactions, see
Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957).
12. Ellis, supra note 9, at 145 (citing P. Michael Hebert & James R. Pettaway,
Sales of Another’s Movables – History, Comparative Law, and Bona Fide
Purchases, 29 LA. L. REV. 329, 360 (1969)).
13. For example, one scholar characterized the courts’ actions as follows:
From the point of view of Louisiana, the significance of the judicial
disregard of Romanist juridical method, of the judicial reception of crude

2022]

COMMENT

1225

the Louisiana legislature modernized the Civil Code in 1979 to adopt the
common law principles utilized by the Louisiana courts, forming the
civilian-friendly good faith purchaser doctrine in Louisiana. 14 The codal
provisions of the Louisiana good faith purchaser doctrine supplied the
circumstances in which protection would be shifted from the original
owner to the good faith purchaser. 15 However, following the 1981 repeal
of the good faith purchaser doctrine’s cornerstone provision—Louisiana
Civil Code article 520—courts were once again left without a clear method
on how to achieve the proper balance between the security of ownership
and the security of the transaction in situations involving precarious
possessors. 16
Article 520 of the Louisiana Civil Code once governed the sale of
movable things by precarious possessors. 17 Article 520 provided a direct
solution for a situation in which B, a precarious possessor of a thing owned
by A, sold the thing to C; if C was in good faith and paid fair value for the
thing, C was awarded ownership of the thing. 18 However, the Louisiana
legislature repealed article 520, leaving a gap in the good faith purchaser
doctrine—a gap that has yet to be filled. 19 Thus, Louisiana courts and
practitioners have been left without any definite guidance as to the
applicable law for sales by precarious possessors. 20 To make matters
worse, the Louisiana legislature enacted a provision in the Lease of
concepts, must be honestly considered. Should there not be a demand for
a return to the code and Romanist juridical method? Furthermore, the
alternative of draughting a new code to meet modern and American
needs, or of repealing the civil code with the view of totally embracing
the Anglo-American system, must be envisaged.
Franklin, supra note 6, at 612.
14. Act No. 180, 1979 La. Acts 430. The terms “good faith purchaser
doctrine” and “bona fide purchaser doctrine” can be used interchangeably. For
purposes of this Comment, use will be limited to “good faith purchaser doctrine”
for Louisiana law and “bona fide purchaser doctrine” for the Uniform Commercial
Code and common law.
15. LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 88.
16. Stroud, supra note 11, at 62.
17. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:3.
18. Article 520 once provided, “A transferee in good faith for fair value
acquires the ownership of a corporeal movable, if the transferor, though not
owner, has possession with the consent of the owner, as pledgee, lessee,
depositary, or other person of similar standing.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 520
(1979) (repealed 1981).
19. John A. Lovett, Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law, 78 LA. L. REV.
1163, 1195 (2018).
20. Id.
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Movables Act (LMA) that artificially expands the scope of precarious
possession, further compounding the confusion surrounding precarious
possession in Louisiana. 21
Between the repeal of Louisiana Civil Code article 520 and the
enactment of the LMA, the current state of the law in Louisiana
surrounding precarious possession is uncertain, confusing, and out of step
with the rest of the country. The law of other U.S. jurisdictions contains
definite provisions for the subsequent sale by a precarious possessor and
does not contain a complicating provision similar to Louisiana’s LMA. 22
Thus, Louisiana law varies significantly from Anglo-American law. 23
Louisiana’s variations, resulting from the repeal of article 520 and the
enactment of the LMA, create uncertainty in the law of sales of movables
and create problems for transactions in which goods cross state lines, a
situation that could involve the laws of multiple states. Because of this
uncertainty of law, parties are more likely to resort to litigation rather than
settling disputes regarding sales of movables. 24 Although similarities often
exist across the common law of the other U.S. jurisdiction, jurisdictions
still frequently diverge. 25 However, the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) has significantly aided in preventing these
divergences in the jurisdictions choosing to adopt its provisions. 26
Louisiana should follow suit in the area of sales by precarious possessors,
and resolution of Louisiana’s uncertainty and divergence of law must fall
within the hands of its creators—the Louisiana legislature. 27
First, the Louisiana legislature should repeal the provision of the LMA
to dispose of the artificial expansion of precarious possession. Next, the
Louisiana legislature should enact new legislation to fill the lingering gap
in the good faith purchaser doctrine and clarify the law surrounding
subsequent sales by precarious possessors. 28 In drafting a new Civil Code
article, the legislature should look to the UCC for guidance. A comparison
21. The LMA contains a provision, specifically Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:3310(B), that treats a transfer of ownership as merely a transfer of possession.
As such, the LMA demotes a new owner to a precarious possessor. See discussion
infra Part III.
22. LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 115, 330.
23. Id. at 330.
24. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1129 (2002).
25. Id. at 1114.
26. See generally id.
27. Spencer C. Sinclair, The Louisiana Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine:
Codified Confusion, 89 TUL. L. REV. 517, 540 (2014).
28. See generally id.
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between the Louisiana good faith purchaser doctrine and the UCC bona
fide purchaser doctrine reveals a striking, and likely intentional, similarity
in the structure, content, and policy behind the complementary provisions.
In repealing unnecessary legislation and enacting new legislation, the
Louisiana legislature would achieve two major goals of Louisiana law—
clarity in the law and uniformity of law across state lines. Although this is
not the first comment to address the issue following the repeal of article
520, this Comment will be the first to comprehensively examine the UCC
commercial bona fide purchaser doctrine in search of a solution. 29
Part I of this Comment will provide background information on the
evolution of the good faith purchaser doctrine in Louisiana, from the prerevision law of equitable estoppel to the repeal of Louisiana Civil Code
article 520. Part II will illustrate the current gap in the law of sales by
precarious possessors following the repeal of article 520 by examining the
inadequacy of the potential solutions under current law and the post-repeal
Louisiana jurisprudence. Part III will provide an overview of the events
leading to Louisiana’s enactment of the LMA, further highlighting the
issues surrounding precarious possession in Louisiana. Part IV will
provide a survey of the UCC bona fide purchaser doctrine in search of a
solution. Part V will compare and contrast Louisiana law and the UCC to
further highlight the current gap and confusion in Louisiana law. Lastly,
Part VI will propose the repeal of the problematic provision of the
Louisiana LMA and the drafting of new legislation governing sales by
precarious possessors with the goal of promoting the clarity of law and the
uniformity of law across state lines.
I. HISTORY, POLICY, AND PROVISIONS OF LOUISIANA’S GOOD FAITH
PURCHASER DOCTRINE
The law of sales must address the sale of a movable thing by someone
other than the true owner of the thing, and the attempted resolution of the
resulting conflict pits two competing interests against one another. 30 On
the one hand, the law seeks to protect the rights and interests of the owner
of a thing, which is often referred to as the security of ownership. 31 The
security of ownership is furthered by the law’s protection of the wealth,

29. See generally id.; Stroud, supra note 11; Tanya Ann Ibieta, The Transfer
of Ownership of Movables, 47 LA. L. REV. 841 (1987).
30. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:2 (citing Weinberg,
Markets Overt, Voidable Title, and Feckless Agents: Judges and Efficiency in the
Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1981)).
31. Id.
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value, and assets of owners. 32 Thus, the security of ownership represents
the rights and interests of A, the owner of a thing, when B, a precarious
possessor of the thing, sells the thing to C, a good faith purchaser. 33 The
law attempts to protect A’s rights and interests in his assets by recognizing
that A’s ownership is not lost through B’s misconduct. 34
On the other hand, the law also attempts to protect the rights and
interests of the buyer of a thing, which is often referred to as the security
of transaction. 35 The security of transaction is promoted by the
safeguarding of profitable exchanges, which create new wealth, value, and
assets for owners. 36 Thus, the security of transaction represents the rights
and interests of C, the good faith purchaser of a thing, when B, a precarious
possessor of the thing belonging to A, sells the thing to C. 37 The law
attempts to protect C’s rights and interests in his new asset by recognizing
the validity of the ownership interest that was created in C’s transaction
with B. 38
All legal systems must support and promote both the interests of
owners of a thing and the interests of purchasers of a thing. 39 In doing so,
the law must resolve the conflict that the opposing interests sometimes
create by providing rules on when to protect the security of ownership and
when to protect the security of transaction. 40 Two historical approaches
illustrate methods by which the law might achieve the protection of one
security over the other. 41
A. Protection of Ownership vs. Protection of Transactions: The
Historical Approaches
The common law principle nemo dat quod non habet, which means no
one can transfer a greater right than he himself has, promotes the security
of ownership by recognizing that no one can transfer a right greater than
32. Id.
33. Franklin, supra note 6, at 590–91.
34. Id.
35. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:2.
36. Id.
37. Franklin, supra note 6, at 590–91.
38. Id.
39. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:2 (noting that the
very first article in the Harvard Law Review, James Barr Ames, Purchase for
Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1887), was dedicated to the topic of
sales of a thing belonging to another).
40. Id.
41. See generally Franklin, supra note 6.
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the right he or she has in a thing. 42 This principle prohibits the transfer of
ownership to a third party by one with less than ownership in the thing, so
the dispossessed owner retains ownership. 43 Thus, A, the owner of the
thing, will retain ownership even though B, a precarious possessor, sells
the thing to C, a good faith purchaser.
On the contrary, the French maxim en fait de meubles, la possession
vaut titre, which means with respect to movables possession is equivalent
to title, promotes the interest in the security of transaction by equating
possession of a movable to title. 44 Under this principle, the purchaser may
regard the possessor as owner of the thing and as having the ability to
transfer that ownership. 45 Thus, C, the good faith purchaser, is awarded
ownership in a transaction with B, a precarious possessor of a thing
belonging to A.
The two opposing historical principles have long influenced the laws
governing the sale of movable things by non-owners. 46 The interests that
these historical principles advance, namely the security of ownership and
the security of transaction, reappear throughout the evolution of the law of
sales across the world, including in Louisiana. 47 Notably, exceptions have
tempered these historical approaches to balance the interest that each

42. Ibieta, supra note 29, at 841.
43. Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12 (citing L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES §
79, at 401 (2d ed. 1959)).
44. Id. at 332 (noting the maxim’s codification in article 2279 of the Code
Napoleon, which provided, “With reference to movables, possession is considered
equivalent to a title.” CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2279 (Fr.) (E.
Blackwood Wright trans., 1908)). The text of article 2279 now appears unchanged
in article 2276 of the French Civil Code. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra
note 5, at § 7:2.
45. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:2.
46. See generally Franklin, supra note 6.
47. See generally Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12.
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principle promotes with the opposing interest. 48 However, not all legal
systems have reached the same balance. 49
For example, the common law’s general rule of nemo dat quod non
habet protects the security of ownership, but this rule is riddled with
exceptions designed to protect the security of transaction. 50 These
exceptions, collectively known as the common law bona fide purchaser
doctrine, shift protection to purchasers who have purchased in good faith,
without notice, and for valuable consideration. 51 However, qualifying as a
bona fide purchaser is not enough to negate the common law’s general
principle; the bona fide purchaser must also fall into a jurisprudentially
recognized exception. 52 Founded on equitable principles, these exceptions
protect bona fide purchasers in market overt sales, transfers of money and
negotiable instruments, sales involving voidable title, and instances of
equitable estoppel. 53
B. Before the 1979 Revision: The Civil Code’s Protection of Ownership
Louisiana’s first codification of laws occurred in 1808 when the
Louisiana legislature adopted what is colloquially known as the Digest of
1808. 54 Although the redactors borrowed heavily from the French Code,
they did not directly incorporate the French maxim of la possession vaut

48. For example:
The basic rule of the English common law in dealing with the conflict
between a good faith possessor of goods and their original owner was
that the buyer of goods obtained no better title than the seller himself
possessed. . . . [A] policy as harsh as this on English commercial
transactions did not survive long without exceptions.
Id. at 337. “The French Code began with the basic rule. . . . The exception was
then immediately added that if the owner lost the movable or it was stolen from
him he had a period of three years during which he could recover it from anyone
he found in possession.” Id. at 333.
49. Stroud, supra note 11, at 43 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11).
50. Ellis, supra note 9, at 150 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 87).
51. Id. at 150–51 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 81).
52. Id. at 151.
53. For a full discussion of the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine, see
Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954).
54. History of the Codes of Louisiana: Civil Code: The Unusual History and
Early Development of Louisiana Law, THE LAW LIBR. OF LA., https://lasc.lib
guides.com/c.php?g=254608&p=1697972 [https://perma.cc/CZ3R-M5JA] (last
updated Jul. 25, 2019).
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titre into the Digest of 1808. 55 Scholars have attempted to rationalize the
redactors’ decision. For example, some scholars have theorized that the
opposition stemmed from the Spanish law in effect in Louisiana at that
time, which opposed the French doctrine. 56 Other scholars have theorized
that the economic system in Louisiana at that time did not favor the French
principle or that the drafters fundamentally misunderstood the French
maxim. 57 Regardless of the explanation, the redactors of the Digest of
1808 chose not to recognize the French approach’s broad protection of
transactions. 58
Although the redactors of the Digest of 1808 rejected the French
maxim, the underlying principle was adopted in other Louisiana code
articles prior to the revision of 1979. 59 In general, Louisiana protected the
ownership of movables under article 2452 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870, which provided, “The sale of a thing belonging to another person is
null; it may give rise to damages, when the buyer knew not that the thing
belonged to another person.” 60 However, Louisiana law shifted protection
to the purchasers under particular circumstances. 61 For example, article
1922 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided, “[I]f the vendor, being
in possession, should, by a second contract, transfer the ownership of the
property to another person, who gets the possession before the first
obligee, the last transferee is considered as the owner . . . .” 62 Additionally,
Louisiana law afforded a purchaser the right of reimbursement—but still
not ownership—under articles 3506 and 3507 of the Civil Code of 1870. 63
Under these articles, if a purchaser bought a lost or stolen thing at a public
auction or from a merchant customarily selling those things, and the
purchaser possessed the thing for three years, the owner could recover the
thing only upon reimbursing the purchase price. 64 Although the Louisiana
Civil Code contained exceptions to its general protection of ownership, the
55. Ellis, supra note 9, at 155.
56. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:2; Hebert &
Pettaway, supra note 12, at 343.
57. For a full discussion on the uncertainty surrounding the sources of the
Digest of 1808 provisions governing the conflict of possessor and owner, see
Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12; Franklin, supra note 6.
58. Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 342.
59. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 521 (citing 3 LA. STATE LAW INST., COMPILED
EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA pt. II, at 1131 (1942)).
60. Ellis, supra note 9, at 156 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (1870)).
61. Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 343.
62. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1922 (1870).
63. Id. arts. 3506, 3507.
64. Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 344.
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provisions generally favored the security of ownership over the security of
transaction. 65
C. Before the 1979 Revision: The Judicial Protection of Transactions
Louisiana courts recognized that the 1870 Civil Code’s protection of
the original owner would hurt consumers and impede commerce. 66 In
response to these concerns, Louisiana courts developed two major
jurisprudential exceptions to the general rule of article 2452 to balance the
security of ownership with the security of transaction. 67 In doing so, the
courts took a similar approach to the common law bona fide purchaser
doctrine. 68 In applying these common law principles, the Louisiana courts
developed two categories of exceptions to the general rule of article 2452:
(1) cases in which title had passed between the original owner and the
intermediate seller and (2) cases in which no title had passed but the owner
offered possession and some indicia of ownership to the intermediate
seller. 69
Under the first exception, Louisiana courts avoided applying article
2452 when title had passed between the original owner and the
65. Franklin, supra note 6, at 604.
66. Ibieta, supra note 29, at 843 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 94).
67. Id. at 844 (citing Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 359).
68. Id. at 843 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 94). At common law, the
general rule is that no one can transfer a right that he does not have, which protects
the security of ownership. Ellis, supra note 9, at 150 (citing 2 S. WILLISTON,
SALES OF GOODS § 311 (rev. ed. 1948)). However, the general rule is subject to
the exceptions of the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine, which shifts
protection to security of transaction. Id. at 151 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11,
at § 81). The first Louisiana Supreme Court case applying the common law bona
fide purchaser doctrine was Miles v. Oden, which involved the fraudulent
conveyance of slaves. Stroud, supra note 11, at 49 (citing Miles v. Oden, 8 Mart.
(n.s.) 214 (La. 1829)). The Miles court relied on Fletcher v. Peck, a United States
Supreme Court decision, which established the common law bona fide purchaser
doctrine as a principle of natural law. Id. (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810)). The Miles decision was limited to the application of Kentucky
law, but the Louisiana Supreme Court extended the ruling to Louisiana law in
Thomas v. Mead, although the decision was legally flawed under the law in effect
at that time in that it ignored the Louisiana codal scheme in place and the
protection of ownership of slaves under the public records doctrine. Id. (citing
Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 341 (La. 1829)). Be that as it may, those decisions
began the systematic adoption of the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine
in Louisiana. Id. at 50 (citing Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 348).
69. Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 359.
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intermediate seller but was deemed to be relatively null.70 The courts
would find that even though the title was relatively null, title had still
passed from the original owner to the intermediate seller.71 Thus, the
movable thing no longer belonged to the original owner, and article 2452
would not apply. 72 Instead, the intermediate seller could validly pass this
title to a subsequent purchaser, and, as a result, the subsequent purchaser
would obtain ownership of the thing. 73 The original owner was left with
no action against the subsequent purchaser under article 2452. 74 The
original owner was left only with an action claiming relative nullity, which
could only be asserted against the intermediate seller. 75 Once ownership
was passed to the subsequent purchaser, the purchaser was protected from
the claims of the original owner. 76
The second exception involved cases where the owner turned over
possession of the thing and offered some indicia of ownership or
authority 77 to the possessor. 78 In these cases, Louisiana courts applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, 79 holding that the original owner
70. Ibieta, supra note 29, at 844. Some examples included fraudulent
impersonation and dishonored checks. Id. (first citing Freeport & Tampico Fuel
Oil Corp. v. Lange, 102 So. 313 (La. 1924); then citing Port Fin. Co. v. Ber, 45
So. 2d 404 (La. App. Orl. 1950); then citing Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230
So. 2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); and then citing Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d
477 (La. 1957)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Indicia of ownership or authority included, but was not limited to, title
papers, invoices, or statements made in the presence of others. Id. at 845 (citing
LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 87).
78. Id. at 844 (citing Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12, at 359).
79. The application of equitable estoppel is explained as follows:
The owner of a movable held by a purchaser in good faith who bought it
from one with neither title nor authority to sell may also be precluded
from recovering the thing by the operation of the principle of estoppel.
This is so whenever the owner by his words or conduct has expressly or
impliedly represented that the one in possession of the thing either is the
owner or has authority to sell. Under such circumstances the owner is
estopped, or precluded from denying the truth of his representation to a
third party who, in good faith and reasonably relying on the
representation, purchased the thing.
Id. at 844 n.19 (quoting LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 87).
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negligently contributed to her own loss. 80 The possessor would then be
liable to the original owner for a conversion. 81 Because the original owners
were negligent, they could not seek recourse against a subsequent
purchaser; thus, the subsequent purchaser retained ownership of the
thing. 82
Nevertheless, the Louisiana courts’ reliance on the common law bona
fide purchaser doctrine in imposing these exceptions was heavily
criticized. 83 This infiltration of common law principles via jurisprudence
was seen as a fundamental breach of the civilian tradition—“The code
written over by the case law, borrowing Anglo-American concepts, under
the self-deluding disguise that they are natural law.” 84 In response, the
Louisiana legislature codified these common law principles in the 1979
Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code. 85
D. The 1979 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code: The Good Faith
Purchaser Doctrine Today
In 1979, the Louisiana legislature carried forward and clarified the
already-existing codal provisions, while also codifying the jurisprudential
exceptions developed by the Louisiana courts. 86 These provisions,
collectively known as the good faith purchaser doctrine, are found in
Louisiana Civil Code articles 518 and 520 through 525. 87 During the
revision, the legislature retained article 2452, which continues to operate
as the general rule protecting the security of ownership. 88 Articles 518 and
520–524 effectively operate as either specific applications of or exceptions
to article 2452. 89
1. The General Rule and General Provisions
Article 2452 was not amended in 1979 but was revised in 1993. 90 This
revision, which is still in place today, modernized the language of the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Franklin, supra note 6, at 609–12.
Id. at 609.
Sinclair, supra note 27, at 522.
Id.
Id. (citing 3 LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. exposé des motifs, at 9 (2010)).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (2021).
Sinclair, supra note 27, at 522.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 cmt. a (2021).
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article but did not change the law. 91 The revision recognized that “[t]he
sale of a thing belonging to another may have some effects in certain
circumstances,” namely when one of the exceptions codified in the good
faith purchaser doctrine applies. 92 The current version of article 2452
provides, “The sale of a thing belonging to another does not convey
ownership.” 93
This general bar on the transfer of ownership by one other than the
owner affords protection to the security of ownership; however, the
codification of exceptions shifted the weight of protection to the security
of transaction by safeguarding good faith purchasers under certain
circumstances. 94 It is important to note at the outset that, according to
article 525, the circumstances codified as exceptions in the good faith
purchaser doctrine do not apply to registered movables. 95 Additionally, the
application of any exception to the general bar on the sale of movable
things by a person other than the owner requires good faith on the part of
a subsequent purchaser. 96 Article 523 creates a presumption that “[a]n
acquirer of a corporeal movable is in good faith . . .”; however, that
presumption can be rebutted if the acquirer “knows, or should have known,
that the transferor was not the owner.” 97
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. art. 2452.
94. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 525.
95. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 525 (2021). Registered movables include
vehicles, mobile homes, and other larger movables. Sinclair, supra note 27, at
525. For registered movables, the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law requires the
furnishing of a certificate of title for a registered movable to be transferred, but
the case law is not consistent. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at
§ 7:9. For example, courts have on occasion ignored the requirement of
registration when the state Department of Motor Vehicles was slow in issuing or
changing registration. Id. (first citing Robinson v. Jackson, 225 So. 2d 846 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971); then citing Tarver v. Tarver, 242 So. 2d 374 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1970); then citing Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957); and then
citing Transp. Equip. Co. v. Dabdoub, 69 So. 2d 640 (La. Ct. App. Orl. 1954)).
96. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 518, 521, 524 (2021).
97. Id. art. 523. If the owner knows that the transferor was not the owner, then
there is no good faith. Livestock Producers, Inc. v. Littleton, 748 So. 2d 537, 544–
45 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1999). “But, where actual knowledge is absent, the article
imputes knowledge if the purchaser has access to facts which would lead a prudent
man to question the ownership of his vendor.” Id. at 545 (citing Brown & Root,
Inc. v. Se. Equip. Co., Inc., 470 So. 2d 516 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985)). “If the
acquirer has notice of facts that would put a reasonably prudent man on inquiry,
he is under duty to investigate with the view to ascertaining the true situation. If
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2. A Specific Application of the General Rule: Louisiana’s Treatment
of Lost or Stolen Things
The articles on lost or stolen things function as a specific application
of article 2452. In the case of lost or stolen things, the Louisiana Civil
Code awards ownership to the original owner in accordance with article
2452, but the purchaser is allowed a right to reimbursement under certain
circumstances. 98 In general, article 521 provides that “[o]ne who has
possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfer its ownership to
another.” 99 Thus, if B is in possession of a stolen thing belonging to A and
subsequently sells the thing to C, A retains ownership of the thing.
Because the thing is stolen, article 521 provides that A will be able to
reclaim the thing from C. This rule is an application of the common law
principle that no one can transfer a right that he does not have. 100
However, the subsequent purchaser may be allowed a right to
reimbursement before having to abandon possession of the thing. 101 This
principle is derived from articles 3506–3507 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870. 102 Article 524 first states that “[t]he owner of a lost or stolen
movable may recover it from a possessor who bought it in good faith at a
public auction or from a merchant customarily selling similar things on
reimbursing the purchase price.” 103 Thus, in the scenario described above,
C will have a right to reimbursement if either (1) the thing was purchased
at public auction or (2) B is a merchant customarily selling similar things.
Although A will still have ownership of the thing, the thing will remain in
C’s possession until A reimburses the purchase price to C.
An owner will have this right to reclaim stolen goods upon
reimbursement of the purchase price unless the thing has been sold by
authority of law. 104 Article 524 continues, “The former owner of a lost,
stolen, or abandoned movable that has been sold by authority of law may
he does not do so, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith.” LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 523 cmt. b (2021) (citing William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 52 So.
131 (La. 1910)).
98. Id. arts. 521, 524.
99. Id. art. 521.
100. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:10.
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 524 (2021).
102. Recall that under articles 3506 and 3507 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870, a purchaser who bought a lost or stolen thing was not awarded ownership
but was allowed a right to reimbursement under certain conditions. See discussion
supra Section I.B.
103. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 524 (2021).
104. Id.
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not recover it from the purchaser.” 105 Thus, if C purchases a stolen thing
at a sheriff sale, then A will not be able to recover the thing from C even
upon reimbursement of the purchase price. 106
3. The First Exception: Louisiana’s Treatment of Sales Affected with
a Vice of Consent
Article 522 is the first major exception to the general rule of article
2452 and applies in situations where a sale between the original owner and
the intermediate seller is affected with a vice of consent.107 This article is
a codification of one of the two lines of jurisprudential exceptions
developed by Louisiana courts prior to the 1979 revision. 108 Article 522
provides, “A transferee of a corporeal movable in good faith and for fair
value retains the ownership of the thing even though the title of the
transferor is annulled on account of a vice of consent.” 109 When the
original transfer of title is null as between the original seller and original
buyer, the original buyer may validly transfer ownership to a subsequent
purchaser in good faith who pays fair value. 110 Thus, if B purchases a thing
from A and subsequently sells the thing for value to C, a good faith
purchaser, C will be awarded ownership even if the sale between A and B
was affected with a vice of consent. The protection of the good faith
purchaser shifts the law’s protection to the security of transaction.
Articles 2021, 2028, and 2035 reiterate the rule articulated by article
522. Article 2028 provides, “Any simulation, either absolute or relative,
may have effects as to third persons.” 111 Comment (b) to article 2028 states
that good faith purchasers “are among the third persons who may avail
themselves of a simulation . . . .” 112 Similarly, article 2035 provides,
“Nullity of a contract does not impair the rights acquired through an
onerous contract by a third party in good faith.” 113 According to comment
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The vices of consent include error, fraud, and duress. Id. art. 1948.
108. Recall that under the jurisprudential exception involving relatively null
title, Louisiana courts would find that title had nevertheless passed from the
original owner to the intermediate seller and, as a result, the intermediate seller
could validly pass title to a subsequent purchaser. See discussion supra Section
I.C.
109. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 522 (2021).
110. Id. art. 522 cmt. b.
111. Id. art. 2028.
112. Id. art. 2028 cmt. b.
113. Id. art. 2035.
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(a), article 2035 “merely articulates the doctrine[] of bona fide
purchase . . . .” 114 Finally, article 2021 provides, “Dissolution of a contract
does not impair the rights acquired through an onerous contract by a third
party in good faith.” 115 Each of the preceding articles articulates the
principle that good faith purchasers in a subsequent sale are protected by
the law, even though a claim for unenforceable title may result in the
nullification of the initial sale.
4. The Second Exception: Louisiana’s Treatment of the DoubleDealing Seller
Article 518, another major exception to the general rule of article
2452, governs the rights of parties when the owner of a movable thing sells
to one person without delivering the thing and instead sells the thing to a
second person. 116 This article is derived from article 1922 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870. 117 Article 518 provides that “[t]he transfer of
ownership takes place as between the parties by the effect of the agreement
and against third persons when the possession of the movable is delivered
to the transferee.” 118 When the thing is sold to the first party, ownership is
transferred by effect of agreement. 119 However, the transfer of ownership
is not effective against third parties until the buyer takes possession of the
thing. 120 Article 518 further provides, “When possession has not been
delivered, a subsequent transferee to whom possession is delivered
acquires ownership provided he is in good faith.” 121 Thus, if A sells a thing
to B, who does not take possession of the thing, then A sells the same thing
to C, who takes possession of the thing and is in good faith, ownership will
be awarded to C. Thus, article 518 functions as an exception to the general

114. Id. art. 2035 cmt. a.
115. Id. art. 2021.
116. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT& GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:5.
117. Recall that article 1922 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided,
“[I]f the vendor, being in possession, should, by a second contract, transfer the
ownership of the property to another person, who gets the possession before the
first obligee, the last transferee is considered as the owner . . .” See discussion
supra Section I.B.
118. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 518 (2021).
119. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:4.
120. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:5.
121. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 518 (2021).
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rule of article 2452 in the case of a double-dealing seller and protects the
security of transaction over the security of ownership. 122
5. The Third Exception: Louisiana’s Treatment of Sales by
Precarious Possessors
Article 520 was once a key article of the good faith purchaser doctrine
and functioned as another major exception to the general rule of article
2452. 123 Prior to its repeal, article 520 provided, “A transferee in good faith
for fair value acquires the ownership of a corporeal movable, if the
transferor, though not owner, has possession with the consent of the
owner, as pledgee, lessee, depositary or other person of similar
standing.” 124 Under article 520, a third-party purchaser in good faith would
obtain ownership of a thing purchased for fair value from a precarious
possessor. Thus, if A leased a thing to B, and B subsequently sold the thing
to C, who was in good faith and paid fair value, then C would be awarded
ownership of the thing.
However, due to heavy criticism from the commercial leasing
industry, article 520 was in effect only for a short time. 125 Commercial
lessors of heavy equipment were concerned that their leased equipment
could “be transferred by the lessee to a purchaser in good faith for fair
value to the detriment of the [commercial] lessor-owner . . . .” 126 The
commercial lessors’ concern was unfounded for two major reasons. 127
First, commercial lessors of registered movables had no reason to worry
about the effects of article 520 on their equipment.128 Article 525 expressly
excludes registered movables from the operation of the good faith
purchaser doctrine; instead, registered movables are arguably protected by
the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law. 129 Second, commercial lessors of
122. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:5 (citing Cameron
Equip. Co., Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 685 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1996)).
123. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:3.
124. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 520 (1979) (repealed 1981).
125. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:3.
126. Stroud, supra note 11, at 60 (citing Yiannopolous, Memorandum at 6, La.
St. L. Inst. Proc. (Meeting March 6–7, 1981)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. “The Vehicle Certificate of Title Law statute suggests that the
certificate of title will govern ownership of motor vehicles. However, a long line
of jurisprudence suggests otherwise.” LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 116.
Many courts have held that the transfer of ownership of a registered movable is
not hindered by the failure to issue a certificate of title. See, e.g., Flatte v. Nichols,
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unregistered movables can take reasonable measures to protect their
property interests, including an investigation of the credit and insurance of
the lessee, permanently identifying the leased property, or restructuring
the agreement as a sale and retaining a security device. 130
Nevertheless, the efforts of the commercial leasing industry
triumphed. The Louisiana legislature first suspended the operation of
article 520 in 1980 and then officially repealed the article in 1981. 131 With
this repeal, Louisiana sales law was left without an adequate rule for
situations involving the sale of movable things by a precarious possessor
and has remained this way since. 132 The question that remains unanswered
is what rule to apply in determining whether the original owner or the good
faith purchaser of a movable thing is awarded ownership of the thing in
situations involving precarious possessors.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
The repeal of Louisiana Civil Code article 520 in 1981 created
confusion in the law of sales of movable things by precarious possessors.
Although many potential solutions are present in the remaining civil code
articles and jurisprudence, some solutions fail to adequately balance the
security of ownership with the security of transaction, while others directly
contradict legislative intent. Additionally, Louisiana courts have
successfully avoided addressing and solving the issue since the repeal of
article 520.
A. Searching for a Solution in the Current Law
One potential solution to fill the gap in the law surrounding the sale of
a movable thing by a precarious possessor is to apply article 2452, the
general rule. 133 As the sale of a thing by a precarious possessor is the sale
of a thing of another, article 2452 would declare that ownership is not
conveyed to the third-party purchaser. Although this solution guarantees
the protection of original owners, its downfall is that it provides blanket
96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957). Unfortunately, few cases have examined the issue since
the enactment of Civil Code article 525. See LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at
116.
130. Stroud, supra note 11, at 60–61 (citing Yiannopolous, supra note 126).
131. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 526 (citing S. Con. Res. 172, 6th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (La. 1980)).
132. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 7:17.
133. “The sale of a thing belonging to another does not convey ownership.”
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (2021).
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protection to the owners at the expense of the third-party purchaser,
regardless of whether the purchaser acted in good faith. Applying the
general rule of article 2452 when faced when the sale of a precariously
possessed thing would ignore the purpose of the good faith purchaser
doctrine—a purpose that both Louisiana courts and the Louisiana
legislature have acknowledged.
Another potential solution to resolving the determination of who gets
the precariously possessed thing—the third-party purchaser in good faith
or the original owner—involves the application of the doctrine of estoppel
that existed jurisprudentially prior to the 1979 revision of the Civil
Code. 134 However, this approach would simply be a step backward in the
law of sale of movable things by a precarious possessor, as this solution
would require courts to look back to the heavily criticized Louisiana
jurisprudence and ignore the Louisiana legislature’s will.
An alternative approach would be to apply articles 521 and 524, which
govern the sale of a lost or stolen thing, a contrario. 135 If ownership of a
lost or stolen thing cannot be transferred under articles 521 and 524, then,
a contrario, ownership of a thing not classified as lost or stolen can be
transferred. However, this approach results in a rule that is analogous to
repealed article 520, allowing precarious possessors to transfer ownership
to a third person. Because the legislature repealed the article, applying an
analogous rule would provide a solution contrary to legislative will.
A final solution is to classify the thing as lost or stolen and apply
articles 521 and 524 outright. Although many Louisiana courts have relied
upon this solution, 136 as discussed in the next section, articles 521 and 524
are inapplicable to situations in which a precarious possessor has sold a
thing that is not lost or stolen. In fact, article 521 provides that “[a] thing
is stolen when one has taken possession of it without the consent of its
owner.” 137 In the situation of precarious possession, the precarious
possessor does have the consent of the owner; thus, the precariously
possessed thing does not meet the definition of a stolen thing under the
plain language of article 521. 138 As explained in more detail below,
134. See discussion supra Section I.C.
135. An argument a contrario takes a statutory provision that lays down a rule
for x, and one infers from that rule that every non-x is subject to an opposing rule.
BORRIS STARCK, Droit Civil: Introduction, at 55–57 (J.R. Trahan trans., 2d ed.
1976).
136. See, e.g., Livestock Producers, Inc. v. Littleton, 748 So. 2d 537 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1999); La. Lift & Equip., Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1999).
137. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. art. 521 (2021) (emphasis added).
138. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534.
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applying the rules set forth in articles 521 and 524 to situations involving
precarious possession disregards the intended meaning of those articles.
B. The Courts: Avoiding the Issue
When presented with a situation that falls within the gap left by the
repeal of article 520, Louisiana courts have failed to take the opportunity
to clarify the law surrounding the sale of a thing by a precarious
possessor. 139 Interestingly, when faced with the issue, the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal bypassed the precarious-possessor issue
by misclassifying the movable as stolen in two cases: Livestock Producers,
Inc. v. Littleton and Louisiana Lift & Equipment, Inc. v. Eizel.
In Livestock Producers, Inc. v. Littleton, B.L. Littleton purchased 200
pregnant cows from Danny Smith for $150,000. 140 Shortly after the
purchase, Littleton re-branded the cows with his “B.L.” symbol and placed
ear tags on the cows. 141 The cows were originally set to be delivered to
Littleton in November, but they began calving early. 142 Accordingly,
Littleton and Smith entered into an agreement to extend pasturing of the
cows by Smith until February in exchange for Littleton’s payment of an
additional $11,000. 143 However, Smith began experiencing financial
issues and sold 126 of Littleton’s cows to Livestock Producers, Inc. (LPI),
an auction company. 144 Thereafter, LPI’s manager, Ronnie Stratton,
purchased the remaining 74 cows from Smith. 145 LPI reimbursed Stratton
for the 74 cows, so that LPI could claim ownership of all 200 cows. 146
When Littleton became aware of the sale of his cows, he contacted the
police, and a criminal investigation ensued. 147 LPI filed a petition to be
declared owner of the cows. 148 Littleton filed a cross-claim, asserting that
he was the owner of the cows. 149 The Second Circuit held that the cows

139. See generally Livestock Producers, Inc., 748 So. 2d 537.; La. Lift &
Equip., Inc., 770 So. 2d 859.
140. Livestock Producers, 748 So. 2d at 539.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 540.
147. Id. at 539–40.
148. Id. at 540.
149. Id.
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were stolen and applied Louisiana Civil Code article 524. 150 As a result,
Littleton was declared the owner of the cows. 151 The Second Circuit
further found that LPI was not in good faith under Louisiana Civil Code
article 523 and that consequently Littleton was not required to reimburse
LPI to recover the stolen cows under article 524. 152
However, the Second Circuit’s analysis was flawed. The Second
Circuit began its analysis by misclassifying the cows as stolen. 153 Article
521 defines a thing as stolen when it is taken without the owner’s
consent. 154 Smith had possession of the cows with Littleton’s consent
through the agreement extending pasturing of the cows. 155 Thus, through
the agreement, which was essentially a contract of deposit, Smith was
actually a precarious possessor of the cows. 156 The court avoided
addressing the issue of precarious possession by misclassifying the cows
as stolen. 157
Similarly, in Louisiana Lift & Equipment, Inc. v. Eizel, the Second
Circuit classified a thing sold by a precarious possessor as stolen in order
to avoid resolving the precarious possessor issue. 158 Robert Eizel entered
into a rent-to-own agreement with Louisiana Lift & Equipment, Inc. for a
new forklift. 159 Eizel defaulted on his monthly payments and sold the
forklift to Robert Creamer for $9,000. 160 After finding out about the
transaction, Louisiana Lift filed an action against Creamer seeking the
return or value of the forklift. 161 In classifying the forklift as stolen and
150. Id. at 544. Recall that article 524 provides, “The owner of a lost or stolen
movable may recover it from a possessor who bought it in good faith at a public
auction or from a merchant customarily selling similar things on reimbursing the
purchase price.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 524 (2021). Recall that article 523
provides, “An acquirer of a corporeal movable is in good faith for purposes of this
Chapter unless he knows, or should have known, that the transferor was not the
owner.” Id. art. 523.
151. Livestock Producers, 748 So. 2d at 544.
152. Id. at 549.
153. “This case involves the sale of stolen cattle.” Id. at 539.
154. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 (2021).
155. Livestock Producers, 748 So. 2d at 539.
156. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 532 (“The Louisiana rancher was essentially
serving as a depositary for Littleton because Littleton paid him to retain
possession of the cows until they were ready to be transferred.”).
157. Id. at 533.
158. La. Lift & Equip., Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859, 861 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1999).
159. Id. at 861.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 862.
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determining that Creamer, the purchaser, was in good faith, the Second
Circuit concluded that Louisiana Lift was the owner of the forklift and
could reclaim the forklift under the condition that Louisiana Lift first
reimburse Creamer. 162
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Caraway noted that articles 521 and
524 were never intended to apply in the Louisiana Lift situation and
pointed out that this situation would have been governed by former article
520. 163 He noted that the repeal of article 520 did not make the sale of
Louisiana Lift’s property a theft under article 521. 164 Judge Caraway
argued for either (1) total protection of Louisiana Lift under article 2452
or (2) protection of the innocent purchaser resulting from the failure of
Louisiana Lift to perfect its security interest under Chapter 9 if the
transaction qualified as a financed lease. 165
Nevertheless, the court once again avoided the precarious-possessor
issue and applied article 524 to a situation where the thing sold was not
stolen. 166 Louisiana Lift voluntarily gave possession to Eizel through the
rent-to-own agreement. 167 Because Louisiana Lift consented to Eizel’s
possession of the forklift through the agreement, the forklift did not meet
the definition of a stolen thing under article 521. 168
The two cases discussed above would have fallen under repealed
article 520. Had the legislature not repealed Louisiana Civil Code article
520, the result of Livestock Producers would have remained the same, but
the court would have used a proper analysis in reaching that same
conclusion. 169 The agreement to extend Smith’s pasturing of the cows was
essentially a contract of deposit, thereby making Smith a precarious
possessor of Littleton’s cows. 170 Recall that repealed article 520 once
provided, “A transferee in good faith for fair value acquires ownership of
a corporeal movable, if the transferor, though not owner, has possession
with the consent of the owner, as pledgee, lessee, depositary or other

162. Id. at 865–66.
163. Id. at 868 (Caraway, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Caraway, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Caraway, J., dissenting). Judge Caraway’s proposition that Louisiana
Lift perfect a security interest under Chapter 9 is discussed later in this Comment.
See discussion infra Part III.
166. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534 (citing La. Lift & Equip., 770 So. 2d at
861).
167. La. Lift & Equip., 770 So. 2d at 861.
168. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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person of similar standing.” 171 The court in Livestock Producers held that
the subsequent purchasers were not in good faith, which is a basic
requirement for the application of the exceptions under the good faith
purchaser doctrine. 172 Thus, repealed article 520 would have been
inapplicable and would not have allowed for a transfer of ownership to the
subsequent purchasers in this case. 173 Instead, the general rule of article
2452 174 would have applied and would have awarded retention of
ownership to Littleton. Therefore, the result in Livestock Producers under
the application of repealed article 520 would have remained the same as
the court’s ultimate result, but the court would have used the proper
analysis. 175
On the contrary, the outcome of Louisiana Lift would have been
different under a repealed article 520 approach.176 Louisiana Lift
voluntarily relinquished possession of its forklift to Eizel through a lease
agreement. 177 Eizel, a precarious possessor of the forklift, transferred the
forklift to Creamer, who was in good faith. 178 Under repealed article 520,
Creamer’s good faith would result in an award of ownership of the forklift
to him, leaving Louisiana Lift with no ability to recover the property from
Creamer, even upon reimbursement of the purchase price. 179 Thus, if the
legislature had not repealed article 520, its application in Louisiana Lift
would have altered the outcome of the case. 180
C. A Necessary Legislative Solution
The repeal of Louisiana Civil Code article 520 resulted in a gap in
Louisiana law for the sale of a movable thing by a precarious possessor.
In the absence of an adequate solution in the current Louisiana Civil Code
articles and given Louisiana courts’ unwillingness to properly address the
171. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 520 (1979) (repealed 1981).
172. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534.
173. Id.
174. Recall that article 2452 provides, “The sale of a thing belonging to
another does not convey ownership.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (2021).
175. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Reclaiming the forklift upon reimbursement is a remedy allowed only
under article 524 for lost or stolen things. Id.
180. Id. This conclusion is accurate when assuming that the lease in question
was in fact a true lease, as the majority seemed to conclude. However, it may be
more accurate to say that the transaction would have been governed by the LMA,
as is discussed later in this Comment. See discussion infra Section III.D.1.
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issue, the Louisiana legislature must enact a new provision that provides a
rule for the sale of movable things by precarious possessors. On at least
two occasions, Louisiana courts have misapplied the law. In Livestock
Producers, the court misapplied the law but reached a just result.
However, in Louisiana Lift, the court misapplied the law and reached an
unjust result. The legislature’s enactment of a new provision of law will
ensure that in cases involving the sale of movable things by precarious
possessors, courts are able to consistently reach just results using a proper
legal analysis.
III. A COMPLICATING FACTOR: THE LOUISIANA LEASE OF MOVABLES
ACT
Before the Louisiana legislature can properly enact a new provision,
it must consider the Louisiana Lease of Movables Act (LMA), which only
complicates matters further. In particular, a provision of law in the LMA
artificially expands the realm of precarious possession into the world of
conditional sales. This arises in a situation where, for example, A sells a
thing to B, and the parties stipulate that A will retain ownership of the
thing until B pays all or part of the price. Under the common law, such a
sale is referred to as a conditional sale. 181 Louisiana’s treatment of
conditional sales has evolved significantly over time, especially following
the enactment of two major statutory regimes: Chapter 9 of the Louisiana
Commercial Code and the LMA. 182
Historically, conditional sales were disfavored by Louisiana courts. 183
In the above scenario, Louisiana courts would have held that A did not
retain ownership of the thing that he sold conditionally to B; instead, B
obtained ownership at the time of the sale. 184 The adoption of Chapter 9,
which took effect in 1990, did not change the result that Louisiana courts
would have reached prior to its adoption on the question of ownership. 185
Under Chapter 9, the seller, A, obtains an additional right but still does not
retain ownership in the thing. 186 And B, the purchaser, remains the party
who obtains ownership after the sale. 187
181. See LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 320.
182. Id. at 324.
183. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:18.
184. Id.; see generally Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46
So. 193 (La. 1908).
185. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:19; see LA. REV.
STAT. § 10:1-201(b)(35) (2021).
186. LA. REV. STAT. § 10:1-201(b)(35) (2021).
187. Id.
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However, one provision in the LMA functions as an exception to the
stance taken by the courts and Chapter 9. 188 Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:3310(B) provides that in certain situations, A will retain ownership of
the thing, even though a sale has occurred. 189 In this sale, B will not be
seen as an owner of the thing but rather as a precarious possessor, because
B has possession of it with the permission of the owner, A. In effect,
§ 3310(B) expands the scope of precarious possession to a sale in which
ownership has transferred under Louisiana law.
A. Louisiana’s Pre-UCC Approach to Conditional Sales
Prior to Louisiana’s adoption of Chapter 9, Louisiana courts
disfavored the conditional sale of movables. 190 For example, in Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., Barber Asphalt agreed to sell
a steam shovel to Hoyt. 191 Hoyt agreed to pay a total of $1,200 divided
into four equal installments, and the parties’ agreement stipulated that the
seller would remain the owner of the steam shovel until Hoyt paid all four
installments. 192 After paying only the first of four installments, Hoyt sold
the steam shovel to St. Louis Cypress Co. 193 Barber Asphalt subsequently
sued St. Louis, claiming that it still owned the steam shovel. 194 Barber
Asphalt argued that the sale was conditional on payment of the full price
by Hoyt, so ownership never passed to Hoyt; therefore, Hoyt had no legal
right to sell the steam shovel to St. Louis. 195
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Barber Asphalt’s theory as a
legal impossibility. 196 The Court reasoned that payment of the price could
not be a condition precedent to the existence of a sale; rather, the sale is
viewed as a condition precedent to the price.197 The Court further reasoned
that the agreement was a “lopsided” contract, because the buyer was bound
unconditionally to pay the price, but the seller was only bound to transfer
ownership conditionally. 198 Thus, the Court characterized the agreement
188.
189.
190.
191.
1908).
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:20.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3310(B) (2021).
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:18.
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193, 193 (La.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 199.
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as an unconditional sale and held that ownership of the steam shovel had
passed to Hoyt. 199 After Barber Asphalt, Louisiana courts consistently
held that when the real nature of an agreement reveals that it is a
conditional sale, ownership is transferred upon the consent of the parties
as to the thing and the price, and the parties’ intent to delay the transfer of
ownership is wholly disregarded. 200
Although the Barber Asphalt rule remains, two legislative
developments further impacted the conditional sale of movables in
Louisiana: the adoption of UCC Article 9 and the enactment of the
LMA. 201 Although the LMA occurred first in time, one cannot understand
its key effect on the conditional sale of movables without first
understanding UCC Article 9’s contribution.
B. Louisiana’s Adoption of UCC Article 9
On January 1, 1990, Chapter 9 of Louisiana’s Commercial Code took
effect, serving as an important development in the conditional sales of
movables through the creation and regulation of security interests. 202 A
security interest is “an interest in personal property or fixtures, created by
contract, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.” 203 A
secured party’s security interest is protected when that interest attaches to
the collateral, the movable subject to the security interest.204 Chapter 9
provides in pertinent part, “The retention or reservation of title by a seller
of goods notwithstanding perfection of the sale is limited in effect to a
reservation of a ‘security interest.’” 205 In essence, the seller of goods
retains only a security interest in the goods, while the purchaser of the
goods obtains title to the goods. 206 Thus, both Chapter 9 and Barber
199. Id.
200. LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 324; see, e.g., Succession of Dunham,
408 So. 2d 888 (La. 1981).
201. Id. While more than two legislative enactments impact the conditional
sales of movables, these two particular enactments are the most relevant to this
Comment.
202. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:19.
203. LA. REV. STAT. § 10:1-201(b)(35) (2021).
204. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:19.
“‘Attachment’ . . . requires that ‘value be given,’ that there be a security
agreement . . . and that the debtor have ‘rights in the collateral or the power to
transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party.’” Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:9-203(b), 10:9-203(b)(1), 10:9-201(a), 10:9-102(a)(73), 10:9203(b)(2) (2021)).
205. LA. REV. STAT. § 10:1-201(b)(35) (2021).
206. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:19.
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Asphalt regard the buyer as the owner, but Chapter 9 goes beyond Barber
Asphalt by converting the seller’s attempted retention of title to a security
interest in the thing. 207
Sellers have frequently attempted to evade this rule by disguising a
conditional sale as a lease with an option to purchase so that the seller may
retain ownership of the goods. 208 In this situation, the agreement is often
designated as a lease, but the true nature of the agreement is a sale that
creates a security interest, or a conditional sale.209 Sellers hope that the
classification of the agreement as a lease will allow for the retention of
ownership as a “lessor” until the “lessee” exercises his option to purchase
the thing at the end of the lease. 210 However, a proper Chapter 9 analysis
requires that the true nature of the agreement be evaluated, rather than the
designation provided by the parties. 211
Chapter 9 distinguishes between a true lease and a disguised
conditional sale, regardless of how the parties classify the transaction, by
looking to the facts of each case. 212 When a transaction designated as a
lease is found to create a security interest, the transaction is deemed a
conditional sale and is subject to the laws of Chapter 9. 213 As a result, the
seller, who was regarded as the “lessor” in the transaction, does not retain
ownership of the thing. 214 However, if the agreement designated as a lease
by the parties is a true lease and not a disguised conditional sale, then

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-203 (2021). If the lessee’s obligation “is not
subject to termination by the lessee” and one of four factors are present, then the
lease creates a security interest. Id. The four factors “are indicia of true ownership
by the lessee.” Id. The four factors include:
(1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining
economic life of the goods; (2) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for
the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become owner
of the goods; (3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the
remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or
for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease; or
(4) the lease has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease.
Id.
213. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:19.
214. LA. REV. STAT. § 10:1-201(b)(35) (2021).
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Chapter 9 does not apply. 215 In that scenario, the lessor retains ownership
of the movable. 216
Under Chapter 9, Louisiana law is in line with that of the American
common law. 217 Thus, Louisiana’s treatment of conditional sales disguised
as leases under Chapter 9 is the same as the treatment in the other 49
states. 218 However, the Louisiana LMA departs significantly from the law
of conditional sales in the other states. 219 In fact, Louisiana law warns that
“consideration of whether a transaction in the form of a lease of movable
property creates a lease or a security interest must take into account the
Lease of Movables Act.” 220 The LMA contains one significant provision
that alters the ownership rules under Chapter 9 for disguised conditional
sales. 221
C. The Louisiana Lease of Movables Act Explained
The Louisiana legislature enacted the LMA in 1985 to regulate the
rights and remedies surrounding the leases of corporeal movables in
Louisiana. 222 The LMA provisions contain different rules for true leases
and financed leases. 223 A financed lease under the LMA is a transaction in

215. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:19.
216. Id.
217. LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 330.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-203, cmt. (2021).
221. LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 330.
222. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:20.
223. The enactment of the LMA predated Chapter 9. Id. The LMA’s criteria
for determining whether a lease was a true lease or a financed lease was modified
upon Louisiana’s enactment of UCC Chapter 9. Id. Thus, transactions before
January 1, 1990, the effective date of Chapter 9, are governed by a different set of
rules to determine whether a lease is a true lease or a financed lease Id. Prior to
the enactment of the UCC, the LMA set forth two requirements for the
determination: (1) the lessee is bound by the agreement
to pay total compensation over the base lease term which is substantially
equivalent to or which exceeds the initial value of the leased property . . .
and (2) at the termination of the lease, the “lessee is obligated to become,
or has the option of becoming, the owner of the leased property . . . for
no additional consideration or for nominal consideration.”
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3312(a) (2021). If both criteria are satisfied, the agreement
would create a financed lease and not a true lease. Id. Although the pre-Chapter 9
provisions are similar to the Chapter 9 provisions, the courts have greater
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the form of a lease that qualifies as a conditional sale under Chapter 9. 224
Thus, if the transaction is a disguised conditional sale under Chapter 9,
then the transaction is also a financed lease under the LMA. 225
The LMA contains a significant provision for a properly perfected 226
financed lease in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3310(B), providing that
the “lessor” of such a lease retains ownership of the “leased” thing until
the “lessee” completes the performance necessary for the transfer of
ownership. 227 Thus, under the LMA, lessors of properly perfected lease
agreements retain both the security interest in and the ownership of the
leased thing. 228 This result functions as an exception to Louisiana’s
conditional sales jurisprudence and Chapter 9. 229 While ownership is not
retained by the lessor under Louisiana jurisprudence and Chapter 9 as a
general rule, the LMA provides that if the lessor perfects his security
interest, the lessor retains ownership of the thing. 230
Notably, a financed lease is not a lease at all. A financed lease under
the LMA is really just a conditional sale that was disguised as a lease by
the parties. 231 The term is a Louisiana anachronism not used by the other
flexibility under the current version of Chapter 9. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT &
GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:20.
224. A financed lease does not include all conditional sales of movables.
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:20. Conditional sales of
movables not structured as leases are not governed by the LMA, although they
are governed by Chapter 9. Id.
225. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-203 (2021).
226. A lessor may properly perfect a security interest by filing a financing
statement. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:20 (citing LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-310(a) (2021)). For the Louisiana provisions on
perfection, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-308 to 10:9-316.
227. The relevant provision provides:
Notwithstanding the fact that a financed lease creates a security interest
under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws, the lessor under a
properly perfected financed lease shall retain full legal and equitable title
and ownership in and to the leased equipment until such time as the
lessee exercises his option or complies with his obligation to purchase
the leased equipment from the lessor as provided under the lease
agreement. The provisions of this Chapter shall further not affect present
taxation of financed leases.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3310(B) (2021).
228. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:20 (citing
Automotive Leasing Specialists, L.L.C. v. Little, 392 B.R. 222, 236 (W.D. La.
2008)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-203 (2021).
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49 states. 232 Additionally, Louisiana is the only state in which a seller of
goods can retain ownership of the thing under a disguised conditional
sale. 233 Other U.S. jurisdictions apply the rule under Article 9 of the UCC,
providing that the seller retains only a security interest in the thing—never
ownership. 234
D. Chapter 9 and the LMA Applied
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet decided on the
impact of Chapter 9 and the LMA upon the conditional sale of movables,
many of Louisiana’s lower courts have considered the issue of a
conditional sale disguised as a lease. 235 Many times, Louisiana courts have
rendered decisions that have become subject to scholarly criticism. 236
1. True Lease vs. Conditional Sale: Courts Bypassing the
Determination Altogether
On occasion, Louisiana courts have simply bypassed the fundamental
determination of whether a lease is a true lease or a conditional sale.237 For
example, the majority in Louisiana Lift bypassed this fundamental
determination in reaching its holding. 238 Recall that Louisiana Lift and
Eizel entered into a rent-to-own agreement for a forklift, and Eizel sold the
forklift to Creamer after defaulting on the monthly payments. 239 The
majority opinion treated the forklift as stolen and ordered that the forklift
be returned to Louisiana Lift on the condition that Louisiana Lift
reimburse Creamer for the purchase price. 240
The majority in Louisiana Lift never actually classified the transaction
as either a true lease or a conditional sale. 241 In fact, the majority declared
that it was unnecessary to consider whether Chapter 9 was applicable to
the situation at hand. 242 However, Judge Caraway’s dissenting opinion
232. LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 330.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing La. Lift & Equip., Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2000).
239. La. Lift & Equip., 770 So. 2d at 861.
240. Id. at 865–66.
241. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
242. La. Lift & Equip., 770 So. 2d at 868.
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noted that the majority should have explored whether Creamer was
entitled to protection from Louisiana Lift’s failure to perfect a security
interest in the forklift. 243 Although the majority avoided the classification
issue, the majority appears to have treated the contract as a true lease. 244
Notably though, the transaction may have qualified as a conditional sale
subject to Chapter 9. 245 Thus, instead of the protection afforded to
Louisiana Lift upon reimbursement of the purchase price, a conditionalsale analysis under Chapter 9 might have protected Creamer by awarding
him full ownership under Chapter 9 and the LMA—a result contrary to the
holding of the court. 246 The court bypassed the fundamental determination
of whether the agreement at issue was a true lease or a financed lease.
2. True Lease vs. Conditional Sale: The Courts Bypassing a
Chapter 9 Analysis
Even when courts address the true lease and financed lease
determination, some courts have struggled with the Chapter 9 and LMA
analysis. 247 For example, in Hewitt v. Safeway Insurance Co., Brent
Brevelle struck a pickup truck driven by Melissa Dauzat as she was exiting
a parking lot. 248 Debra Hewitt had allowed Dauzat to run an errand in the
pickup truck when the accident occurred. 249 Hewitt’s daughter was a
passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident.250 Hewitt filed suit
against Brevelle and his liability insurer. 251 Hewitt later added State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as an additional defendant,
asserting that State Farm provided liability coverage for the pickup
truck. 252 State Farm argued that it did not.253
The pickup truck involved in the accident was insured by State Farm
in the name of Catherine Bordelon, who was the owner and record title
243. Id. (Caraway, J., dissenting).
244. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
245. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-203 (2021)). Because the court
failed to offer justification for the classification of the agreement as a true lease,
further facts would be needed to suggest a proper classification analysis.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Hewitt v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 787 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2001).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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holder at the time of the accident. 254 However, Bordelon and Hewitt had
entered into a Lease Purchase agreement prior to the accident. 255 The
agreement provided that Bordelon would lease the pickup truck to Hewitt
for 60 months at a monthly rental price.256 State Farm had denied insurance
coverage for the accident on the basis that the Lease Purchase agreement
was a conditional sale that transferred ownership to Hewitt, and thus, the
agreement invalidated the insurance policy issued to Bordelon. 257 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal agreed with the insurer and held that the
agreement was a conditional sale. 258
However, in reaching its holding, the majority never mentioned
Chapter 9. 259 The court acknowledged Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:3310(B) but dismissed the section’s application outright. 260 In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Saunders disagreed with the majority’s analysis;
he determined that the agreement was a disguised sale and that the contract
was a properly perfected financed lease governed by § 3310(B). 261
The majority should have applied Chapter 9 in reaching its finding that
the agreement was a conditional sale.262 Although Judge Saunders
properly found that the agreement was a conditional sale, he erroneously
found that the agreement was a properly perfected financed lease.263
Proper perfection requires that a financing statement be filed, but there
was no such indication in the case. 264 Ultimately, the court applied an
improper analysis of Chapter 9 and the LMA. 265
3. True Lease vs. Conditional Sale: A Proper Legal Analysis but a
Source of Disputes
Even when the courts apply a proper analysis, the accuracy of their
application of Chapter 9 and LMA principles is still sometimes
questionable. 266 In Automotive Leasing Specialists, L.L.C. v. Little, Ida
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
Id.
Hewitt, 787 So. 2d at 1189 (Saunders, J., dissenting).
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Little entered into a “Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement” with Automotive
Leasing Specialists, L.L.C. (ALS). 267 The agreement established a lease
term and monthly payment for the vehicle. 268 Little filed a voluntary
petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. 269 In response,
ALS filed an objection to the Chapter 13 plan on grounds that Little
incorrectly identified the agreement as a conditional sale, rather than a true
lease, so she should not have listed it as an asset. 270 The bankruptcy court
held that the lease satisfied the criteria of a disguised sale under Chapter 9
of the Louisiana Commercial Code and that it was properly listed in the
bankruptcy proceedings as an asset owned by Little. 271
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding. 272 Both
holdings have been criticized by scholars, who note that the issue turned
on the interpretation of the clause “all other amounts then due under this
Lease.” 273 If the clause meant all remaining lease payments, then the lease
was properly found to be a disguised sale; if the clause referred only to the
amount owed at the time of early termination, then the lease should have
been found to be a true lease. 274 Thus, although the court’s legal analysis
was correct, its interpretation of the clause is questionable. 275
E. The Practical Effect of the LMA: Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:3310(B)
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3310(B) allows the “lessor” of a
properly perfected financed lease to retain ownership of the “leased” thing
pending payment of the price by the “lessee.” 276 Thus, if A leases a thing
to B under a properly perfected financed lease, then A will retain
ownership, rather than ownership being transferred to B. Recall that a
267. Auto. Leasing Specialists, L.L.C. v. Little, 392 B.R. 222, 224 (W.D. La.
2008).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 224–25. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy allows the debtor to preserve
existing assets while granting creditors recovery from future income. See Foster
v. Heitkamp, 670 F. 2d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 1982).
270. Auto. Leasing Specialists, 392 B.R. at 225.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 236.
273. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
274. Id.
275. Id. (citing Teresa Davidson, Barry Graynor, Ruthanne Hammett, Edwin
Huddleson, Robert Ihne, & Stephen Whelan, Survey—Uniform Commercial
Code: 2008 Development-Leases, 64 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1188 (2009)).
276. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3310(B) (2021).
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financed lease is not a lease at all; a financed lease is a conditional sale
that is disguised as a lease. 277 The situation at hand is akin to that of a
precarious possessor. B does not have ownership in the thing, because
ownership is retained by A. Instead, B has possession of the thing with the
permission of the owner, A, under the lease. The result is a provision of
law that artificially expands the scope of precarious possession to a
situation in which a sale has occurred. In sum, this provision demotes
someone who should be regarded as the owner of a thing to a precarious
possessor.
As illustrated by Louisiana Lift, Hewitt, and Automotive Leasing,
Louisiana courts have struggled to nail down the interaction between
Chapter 9 and the LMA. 278 The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on
the effect of the two statutory schemes on the conditional sale of
movables. 279 Thus, in response to the artificial expansion of precarious
possession and the confusion surrounding this area of law, the Louisiana
legislature must take action.
IV. SURVEY OF THE COMMERCIAL BONA FIDE PURCHASER DOCTRINE
Before the 1979 revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, Louisiana courts
looked to the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine for guidance when
developing exceptions to Louisiana Civil Code article 2452, Louisiana’s
general prohibition on the sale of a thing belonging to another. 280
However, the reception of common law principles through the courts,
rather than through the Code, was heavily criticized by scholars as a
fundamental breach of Louisiana’s civilian tradition.281 In response, the
Louisiana legislature codified the common law exceptions in the 1979
revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, collectively known as the good faith
purchaser doctrine. 282 In the process, the Louisiana legislature sought to
“re-align Louisiana Law with modern civil law and the Uniform
Commercial Code.” 283 However, since the subsequent repeal of Louisiana
Civil Code article 520 and the introduction of the LMA, Louisiana law has
diverged from the UCC. As a result, Louisiana law is not only unclear but
is also different from the other U.S. jurisdictions.

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. § 10:1-203.
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 5, at § 4:21.
Id.
Ibieta, supra note 29, at 843 (citing LITVINOFF, supra note 11, at § 94).
Franklin, supra note 6, at 609–12.
Sinclair, supra note 27, at 522.
Act No. 180, 1979 La. Acts 430.
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The Louisiana legislature should resolve Louisiana’s divergence. 284
First, uncertainty of the law in a state makes parties more likely to resort
to litigation. 285 Second, in the sale of goods crossing state lines, a dispute
may theoretically involve the law of all U.S. jurisdictions, a situation
nearly impossible to prepare for. 286 Under the common law, the rules of
jurisdictions will often diverge.287 However, the adoption of the UCC has
aided both in the certainty of law and in reducing the divergence in the
U.S. jurisdictions choosing to adopt its provisions. 288 Thus, the Louisiana
legislature should look to the body of law that has already solved the two
outstanding issues present in Louisiana law—the UCC.
A. The Commercial Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine
In an effort to officially realign Louisiana law with the common law
and the UCC, the Louisiana legislature should embrace the commercial
principles when bridging the lingering gap in Louisiana law since the
repeal of Louisiana Civil Code article 520. UCC § 2-403 formulates the
commercial bona fide purchaser doctrine, which UCC § 2A-305 extends
to leases. 289
Section 2-403 of the UCC governs situations in which a third party
purchases goods from a seller who is less than the full owner of the
goods. 290 Section 2-403 begins with its general rule—known as the
“shelter rule”—which codifies the common law principle nemo dat quod
no habet and promotes the security of ownership. 291 The shelter rule is
extended to sales of lost or stolen things, which is known as the void-title
rule. 292 Additional rules in § 2-403 provide exceptions to the shelter rule:
the voidable title and the entrustment rules. 293 When an exception applies,
protection is shifted from the security of ownership to the security of

284. Sinclair, supra note 27, at 540.
285. Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 1129.
286. Id. at 1114.
287. Id.
288. See generally id.
289. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 401 (2021); THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN’S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 2A-305[A][7] (rev. 2d ed.
2020).
290. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][1].
291. Stroud, supra note 11, at 44–45 (citing Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12,
at 153–54).
292. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][6].
293. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 401 (2021).
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transaction. 294 Nevertheless, the exceptions do not apply when the goods
are stolen. 295
Section 2A-305 of the UCC extends the commercial bona fide
purchaser doctrine of § 2-403 to lease agreements. 296 Section 2A-305
governs situations in which possession of goods has been transferred to a
lessee who subsequently sells 297 the goods to a third-party purchaser. 298
Nearly identical in structure to § 2-403, § 2A-305 extends the shelter rule,
the voidable title rule, and the entrustment doctrine to the field of lease. 299
Once again, the exceptions to the shelter rule do not apply when the goods
are stolen. 300
1. The UCC Shelter Rule
The shelter rule functions as the general rule and provides that a thirdparty purchaser obtains no greater rights than the rights that the seller had
to give. 301 Subsection 2-403(1) provides that “a purchaser of goods
acquires all title which his transferor had or had the power to
transfer . . . .” 302 A seller with less than full ownership cannot convey full
ownership of the goods; therefore, the shelter rule protects the security of
ownership. 303
The principle of § 2-403(1)’s shelter rule is extended to the field of
lease in § 2A-305(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “a buyer . . .
from the lessee of goods under an existing lease contract obtains, to the
extent of the interest transferred, the leasehold interest in the goods that
the lessee had or had power to transfer . . . .” 304 Thus, as a general rule, the
lessee of the goods can only transfer the interest that he or she has in the
294. Stroud, supra note 11, at 44–45 (citing Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12,
at 154–55).
295. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][6].
296. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2A-305[A][7].
297. UCC § 2A-305 also governs subsequent leasing of the goods by the
original lessor. For purposes of this Comment, discussion will be limited to the
subsequent sale of goods by the original lessee.
298. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2A-305[A][1].
299. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2A-305[A][7].
300. 4C DAVID FRISCH, Commentary, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2A-305:23 (3d. ed. 2019).
301. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][2].
302. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
303. Stroud, supra note 11, at 44–45 (citing Hebert & Pettaway, supra note 12,
at 153–54.
304. U.C.C. § 2A-305(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
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lease. 305 UCC § 2A-305(1) clarifies that the protection of the security of
ownership under § 2-403(1) extends into the field of lease. 306
2. The Void-Title Rule
It is important to note that the provisions of UCC § 2-403 are not
applicable to stolen things. 307 In the case of lost or stolen goods, the
traditional common law rule, that the original owner’s rights are not
affected by subsequent sales, applies. 308 This common law rule, also
known as the void-title rule, is not changed by the UCC. 309 A subsequent
purchaser of stolen goods does not obtain title to the goods and does not
have a right to the possession of the goods against the rightful owner. 310 A
bona fide purchaser’s ownership interest in and right to possession over
lost and stolen goods is never enforceable against the original owner of the
goods. 311
Like the provisions of § 2-403, the provisions of § 2A-305 are not
applicable to stolen goods. 312 Under this void-title rule, thieves and
subsequent transferors do not acquire any interest in stolen goods.313 The
true owner may always reclaim the goods from a subsequent purchaser,
and the UCC does not alter that rule. 314
3. The Voidable-Title Rule
The general voidable-title rule is an exception to the basic shelter rule
in situations where the seller’s title is voidable. 315 The sale to a good faith

305. FRISCH, supra note 300, at § 2A-305:5 (citing U.C.C. § 2A-305(1) (AM.
L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021)).
306. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2A-305[A][7].
307. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][6].
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 400 (2020).
311. Id.
312. FRISCH, supra note 300, at § 2A-305:23.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][3]. The law uses the concept of
voidable title to single out certain types of wrongdoing, and because the
wrongdoer’s title is voidable, the goods are recoverable by the true owner while
in possession of the wrongdoer. Id. However, once the voidable title falls in the
hands of the third-party purchaser, the title ceases to be voidable and is made
good. Id.
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purchaser 316 for value 317 cures the defect in a seller’s voidable title and
makes the title good in the hands of the purchaser. 318 Once the title is
transferred to the third-party purchaser, the true owner can no longer
recover the goods because ownership of the goods has been transferred to
the third party. 319 This rule promotes finality in commercial transactions
by protecting the title of a purchaser who acquires property for valuable
consideration and is without notice that the seller lacks valid and
transferrable title. 320 The voidable-title rule applies to four specific
scenarios: the imposters situation, the hot checks situation, the cash-sale
situation, and the larceny situation. 321 The general voidable-leasehold rule
in § 2A-305(1) is analogous to the general voidable-title rule of § 2-403(1)

316. The UCC defines a purchaser as “a person that takes by purchase.” U.C.C.
§ 1-201(b)(30) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021). A purchase is defined as
“taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security
interest, issue or reissue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property.” Id. § 1-201(b)(29). Good faith is defined as “honest in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” Id. § 1201(b)(20). Thus, “a ‘good faith purchaser’ is one who, by an honest contract or
agreement, purchases property or acquires an interest therein, without knowledge,
or means of knowledge sufficient to charge him or her with knowledge, of any
infirmity in the title of the seller.” 77A C.J.S. Sales § 402 (2020).
317. The UCC defines value as follows:
[A] person gives ‘value’ for rights if the person acquires them: (1) in
return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the extension of
immediately available credit, whether or not drawn upon and whether or
not a charge-back is provided for in the event of difficulties in collection;
(2) as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction of, a pre-existing
claim; (3) by accepting delivery under a pre-existing contract for
purchase; or (4) in return for any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract.
U.C.C. § 1-204 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
318. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 401 (2020).
319. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][3].
320. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 401 (2020).
321. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][4]. Title is voidable under the
imposters situation when “the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the
purchaser.” U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021). Title
is voidable under the hot checks situation when “the delivery was in exchange for
a check which is later dishonored.” Id. § 2-403(1)(b). Title is voidable under the
cash-sale situation when “it was agreed that the transaction was to be a ‘cash
sale.’” Id. § 2-403(1)(c). Title is voidable under the larceny situation when “the
delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal
law.” Id. § 2-403(1)(d).
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but focuses on the transfer of a leasehold interest rather than on the transfer
of title. 322
4. The Entrustment Doctrine
The entrustment doctrine of § 2-403(2) provides another exception to
the shelter rule. Under the entrustment doctrine, “[a]ny entrusting of
possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him the power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business.” 323 Three requirements must be met before
the entrustment doctrine will apply: (1) there must be an entrustment of
goods, (2) the entrustment must be to a “merchant who deals in goods of
that kind,” and (3) the purchaser must qualify as “a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.” 324 If the three requirements are met, the rights of the
entruster are transferred to the third-party purchaser. 325

322. § 2A-305(1) provides an exception to the shelter rule in situations where
the leasehold of the lessee exists but is flawed in some manner. QUINN, supra note
289, at § 2A-305[A][3]. Section 2A-305(1) provides in part, “A lessee with a
voidable leasehold interest has power to transfer a good leasehold interest to a
good faith buyer for value . . .” U.C.C. § 2A-305(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2021). This rule affords the third-party purchaser “good” leasehold that
was voidable as between the original lessor and lessee. QUINN, supra note 289, at
§ 2A-305[A][3]). While the general voidable-leasehold rule does not define
voidable leasehold interest, § 2A-305(1) singles out three situations of voidable
leasehold interest, also known as the special voidable-title rule. QUINN, supra note
289, at § 2A-305[A][4]. “The lessee under an existing lease has the power to
transfer a goods leasehold interest notwithstanding the fact that ‘the lessor was
deceived as to the identity of the lessee.’” U.C.C. § 2A-305(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. &
UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021). “The lessee under an existing lease has the power to
transfer a goods leasehold interest notwithstanding the fact that ‘the delivery was
in exchange for a check which is later dishonored.’” QUINN, supra note 289, at
§ 2A-305(1)(b). “The lessee under an existing lease has the power to transfer a
goods leasehold interest notwithstanding the fact that ‘the delivery was procured
through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.’” QUINN, supra
note 289, at § 2A-305(1)(c).
323. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021). The
entrustment doctrine involves three parties: (1) the owner of the goods who
entrusts the goods; (2) the seller of the goods who was entrusted with the goods;
and (3) the third-party purchaser of the goods. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2403[A][9].
324. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][9][c].
325. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 406 (2020).
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First, for an entrustment of goods to occur, there must be “any delivery
and any acquiescence in retention of possession . . . .” 326 Although the
UCC does not define possession, courts look to the dealer’s appearance of
control over the goods. 327 If the appearance of control is present, then an
entrustment has occurred. 328
Second, the entrusted seller must qualify as a “merchant who deals in
goods of that kind.” 329 The UCC defines a merchant as
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill. 330
Even if the entrusted seller qualifies as a merchant, the UCC also requires
that the merchant be “one who deals in goods of that kind.” 331 Thus, § 2403(2) concerns a narrower class of merchants based on appearances, from
whom the third-party purchaser has the highest expectation to receive
good title. 332
Third, the third-party purchaser, or the buyer of the entrusted goods,
must be a “buyer in ordinary course of business.” 333 A buyer in the
ordinary course of business is defined as “a person who [is] in good faith
and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party . . . .” 334 The question of whether
a third-party purchaser qualifies as a good faith purchaser is a mixed
question of law and fact. 335 Usually, a person buys goods in the ordinary
course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary
practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the
seller’s own usual or customary practices. 336 Thus, if (1) there was an
326. U.C.C. § 2-403(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
327. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, WHITE AND SUMMERS’
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-12 (5th ed. 2008).
328. Id.
329. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][9][b].
330. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
331. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][9][b].
332. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 327.
333. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][9][c].
334. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
335. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 327.
336. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 408 (2020).
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entrustment of goods, (2) the entrusted seller is a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind, and (3) the third-party purchaser is a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, then the purchaser receives all of the rights in
the thing sold. 337
The entrustment doctrine exception from § 2-403(2) is made
applicable to lease agreements under § 2A-305(2). 338 This doctrine as
applied to the field of lease has three basic components: (1) the goods must
have been entrusted by the lessor, (2) the lessee must be a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind, and (3) the buyer must qualify as a buyer in
the ordinary course of business. 339 If all three requirements are met, the
buyer in the ordinary course of business obtains all of the lessor and
lessee’s rights to the goods and takes them free of the existing lease
contract. 340 Thus, the entrustment doctrine permits the lessee to transfer a
right greater than the right he had in the goods. 341
B. Application of the UCC’s Entrustment Doctrine
The application of the UCC entrustment doctrine is clearly illustrated
in Farmers Livestock Exchange of Bismarck, Inc. v. Ulmer, a North
Dakota Supreme Court case. 342 North Dakota Century Code § 41-02-48(2)
provides, “Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in ordinary course of business.” 343 This provision of North
Dakota law is identical to UCC § 2-403(2).
337. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][5].
338. Id. § 2A-305[A][5].
339. Id. The drafters indicate that § 2A-305 is modeled on the entrustment
rules in the article on sales, § 2-403, so the definitions of “entrustment” and
“merchant who deals in goods of that kind” are also applicable to leases. Id. For
a discussion of definitions of these terms, see discussion supra Section IV.A.4.
However, the definition of “buyer in the ordinary course” differs slightly. FRISCH,
supra note 300, at § 2A-305:4. Section 2A-103(1)(a) provides, “‘Buyer in
ordinary course of business’ means a person who in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him [or her] is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest or leasehold interest of a third party in the goods, buys in ordinary
course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not
include a pawnbroker.” U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N
2021).
340. FRISCH, supra note 300, at § 2A-305:27.
341. Id.
342. Farmers Livestock Exch. of Bismarck, Inc. v. Ulmer, 393 N.W.2d 65
(N.D. 1986).
343. Id. at 67–68.
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In Ulmer, David Bernhardt purchased 53 cows from the Farmers
Livestock Exchange of Bismarck, 48 of which were purchased on the
condition that Bernhardt would pay for them after delivery. 344 Bernhardt
subsequently shipped the cattle to Ashley Livestock Exchange to satisfy a
debt owed by Bernhardt to Ashley Livestock. 345 Ashley Livestock
subsequently sold the 53 cows, and the proceeds were applied to
Bernhardt’s account. 346 Farmers Livestock commenced an action against
Ashley Livestock for the proceeds from the sale of the 48 cows that had
not yet been paid for. 347 The district court determined that the entrustment
doctrine was applicable to the action and afforded Ashley Livestock good
title to the cows. 348 The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed, finding
that Ashley Livestock did not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business because Ashley Livestock gave no new value for the cows. 349
Instead, according to the court, the result of the transaction between
Ashley Livestock and Bernhardt was the satisfaction of an antecedent
debt. 350 Thus, even though Ashley Livestock was in good faith, the
entrustment doctrine did not afford Ashley Livestock ownership of the
cows. 351
V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA LAW AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
The similarity between Louisiana’s good faith purchaser doctrine and
the UCC bona fide purchaser doctrine in structure, content, and policy
reveals the significant gap left after the repeal of Louisiana Civil Code
article 520. The general rule and the voidable-title, stolen-goods, and
double-dealing-seller exceptions are all present and function similarly in
the Louisiana and UCC doctrines. However, the UCC’s entrustment
doctrine highlights the gap in Louisiana law surrounding the subsequent
sale of a thing by a precarious possessor. Although the commercial bona
fide purchaser doctrine functions as a complete set of rules governing all
344. Id. at 66.
345. Id. at 67.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 69–70.
350. Id. at 70.
351. Id. The court concluded that although the entrustment doctrine was not
applicable to the instant action, the provisions of the UCC could be supplemented
with principles of equity. Id. The court ultimately held that Farmers Livestock
must bear the loss. Id. at 71.
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situations in the sale of movable things by a non-owner and balances the
security of transaction with the security of ownership, Louisiana’s good
faith purchaser doctrine remains incomplete, as there is no codal provision
covering the precarious-possessor situation.
A. LA vs. UCC: The General Rules
The Louisiana good faith purchaser doctrine and the UCC bona fide
purchaser doctrine function as exceptions to a general rule. Under the
UCC, the general rule is found in the shelter rule of § 2-403(1), which
provides that “a purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor
had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest
acquires the rights only to the extent of the interest purchased.” 352 Under
Louisiana law, the general rule is found in Louisiana Civil Code article
2452 and provides, “The sale of a thing belonging to another does not
convey ownership.” 353 Thus, under both Louisiana law and the UCC, the
general rule provides that a person without full ownership in the thing
cannot transfer ownership of the thing.
The general rules found in article 2452 of the Louisiana Civil Code
and in the UCC shelter rule promote the security of ownership by barring
the transfer of ownership by someone who is not the true owner of the
thing. These provisions apply the common law principle nemo dat quod
no habet, but the numerous exceptions to this general rule attempt to
balance the security of ownership with the security of transaction by
limiting the general rule in certain situations.
B. LA vs. UCC: Stolen Goods
Notably, both Louisiana’s good faith purchaser doctrine and the UCC
bona fide purchaser doctrine apply the same general rules to stolen goods.
The UCC provisions follow the common law rule that the owner’s rights
in lost or stolen goods are not severed by subsequent sales. 354 Thus, the
buyer always loses when the item purchased is a stolen good. 355 Similarly,
article 521 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[o]ne who has
possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfer its ownership to
another.” 356 Unlike the UCC, Louisiana law does allow for the purchaser
to have a right to reimbursement before having to relinquish possession of
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2452 (2021).
QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][6].
Id. § 2-403[A][6].
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 (2021).
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the thing back to the original owner. 357 In that way, Louisiana is slightly
more protective of transactions in the case of stolen goods.
C. LA vs. UCC: Voidable-Title Rule or Vice of Consent
The general rules under Louisiana law and the UCC are both subject
to a voidable-title exception. Under the UCC, the voidable-title rule of § 2403(1) provides that “a person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value.” 358 Similarly, under
Louisiana law, Civil Code article 522 provides that “[a] transferee of a
corporeal movable in good faith and for fair value retains the ownership
of the thing even though the title of the transferor is annulled on account
of a vice of consent.” 359 Louisiana Civil Code article 522 accords with
UCC § 2-403(1) in that a person having a corporeal movable under
annullable title may validly transfer ownership to an acquirer in good
faith. 360 However, UCC § 2-403(1) allows for a transfer of good title to an
intermediate seller in good faith, while Louisiana allows title to be
transferred to a person either in good or bad faith. 361 Nevertheless,
recovery of the movable by the owner is still limited to when the
subsequent purchaser was in bad faith; the owner may not recover the
movable from an acquirer in good faith under both Louisiana law and the
UCC. 362 The voidable-title exception under the UCC and the vice-ofconsent exception under Louisiana law function as limitations to the
general rule, thereby promoting the security in transactions.
D. LA vs. UCC: The Double-Dealing Seller
While Louisiana Civil Code article 518 provides a specific provision
for the case of the double-dealing seller, the UCC’s analogous approach
lies within its entrustment doctrine of § 2-403(2). Louisiana Civil Code
article 518 provides that “[w]hen possession has not been delivered, a
subsequent transferee to whom possession is delivered acquires ownership
provided he is in good faith.” 363 Thus, if a seller purports to sell a thing to
two purchasers, ownership is awarded to the first purchaser, but the
purchaser that is the first to take possession of the goods obtains ownership
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. art 524.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 522 (2021).
Id. cmt. d.
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 518 (2021).
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that is effective against third parties. Under the UCC, an entrustment
includes not only delivery but “any acquiescence in retention of
possession.” 364 When the first buyer leaves the thing with the seller postsale, an entrustment has occurred where the first buyer is the entruster and
the seller is entrusted with the goods. Because an entrustment has
occurred, UCC § 2-403(2) applies and provides that “[a]ny entrusting of
possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.” 365 If the seller qualifies as a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind and the second purchaser qualifies as a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, then the second purchaser will prevail and
receive ownership of the thing. 366 Although the application of the UCC
approach is more limited than the Louisiana approach, 367 both the UCC
and Louisiana law provide a similar solution to the double-dealing-seller
scenario.
E. LA vs. UCC: Precarious Possession
As the previous subsections illustrate, the Civil Code’s good faith
purchaser doctrine and the UCC bona fide purchaser doctrine share many
parallel provisions; however, Louisiana lacks a rule similar to all situations
falling under the UCC’s entrustment doctrine. Under the UCC, § 2-403(2)
provides that “[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him the power to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.” 368 However,
Louisiana has no equivalent provision in its Civil Code, a result of the
lobbying efforts of the commercial leasing industry. The repeal of
Louisiana Civil Code article 520 left a significant gap in the law
concerning situations in which a nonowner in possession of movable
property with the consent of the owner sells it to a third-party purchaser.
The Louisiana legislature should enact new legislation governing the sale
of a movable thing by a precarious possessor so that Louisiana will have a
complete set of rules in its good faith purchaser doctrine mirroring the
commercial bona fide purchaser doctrine.
364. U.C.C. § 2-403(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
365. Id. § 2-403(2).
366. See discussion supra Section III.A.4.
367. The UCC is more restrictive than the Louisiana approach in article 518
because UCC § 2-403(2) is limited to situations where the entrusted is a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind and a buyer who qualifies as a buyer in ordinary
course of business.
368. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
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The UCC’s entrustment doctrine promotes security in transactions by
protecting the innocent buyer who believes that the merchant has legal title
to the goods. 369 The entruster is in possession of the goods, so the buyer
may therefore assume that the entruster has title to the goods and the
authority to transfer that title.370 The entrustment doctrine places the risk
of loss on true owners who knowingly take the chance of delivering their
goods to a person dealing in goods of the kind. 371 Thus, the rule is designed
to incentivize owners to carefully select to whom they entrust their
property and to facilitate the free flow of goods based on a buyer’s
reasonable expectation that a merchant in possession of the goods also has
title to them. 372 However, Louisiana law does not contain a provision
similar to the UCC’s entrustment doctrine in the context of precarious
possession. Although the Louisiana courts have options for striking the
proper balance, the balance between the security of ownership and the
security of transaction cannot be struck consistently unless another
provision governing the sale of a movable thing by a precarious possessor
is enacted.
F. LA vs. UCC: Conditional Sales
As discussed previously, Louisiana has adopted UCC Article 9;
therefore, Louisiana’s provisions of Chapter 9 are identical to that of the
other U.S. jurisdictions. 373 Recall that leases may raise problems under
UCC Article 9, due to the possibility that a lease agreement may be a
disguised conditional sale or a sale subject to a security interest. UCC § 1201(35) provides the definition for a security interest as “an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secured payment or performance of an
obligation.” 374 According to § 1-201(35), “Whether a lease is intended as
a security interest is to be determined by the facts of each case.” 375 If a
lease is actually a disguised conditional sale, “[t]he retention or reservation
of title by a seller of goods . . . is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest.” 376 Thus, if a seller attempts to disguise a sale conditional
on payment of the price as a lease, UCC Article 9 provides that he does
369. 77A C.J.S. Sales § 405 (2020).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Erwin S. Barbe, Annotation, Equipment Leases as Security Interests
Within Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(37), 76 A.L.R. 3d 11 (2020).
374. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
375. Id.
376. Id.
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not retain ownership of the thing; he is limited to the retention of a security
interest. 377
However, Louisiana departs from this rule in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:3310(B) by providing an exception to the rules found in
Chapter 9 of Louisiana’s Commercial Code. If the seller properly perfects
his security interest in the sale disguised as a lease, the seller will retain
ownership of the thing pending payment of the price. 378 Louisiana is the
only state that that departs from the rule of UCC § 1-201(35). 379
VI. A PROPOSED CIVILIAN APPROACH
The commercial bona fide purchaser doctrine was originally
established in UCC § 2-403, and the concepts were then carried into the
field of lease in § 2A-305. 380 The commercial bona fide purchaser doctrine
can be divided into four basic rules: (1) the shelter rule, (2) the generalvoidable-title rule, (3) the special-voidable-title rule, and (4) the
entrustment doctrine. 381 The shelter rule is the general rule, providing that
a sale by a person with less than ownership in goods cannot convey
ownership of the goods to a third person. 382 In affording protection to the
true owner of the goods, the shelter rule promotes the interest in the
security of ownership. 383 However, the voidable-title rule and the
entrustment doctrine are exceptions to the general shelter rule. 384 When
the exceptions apply, ownership is afforded to a third-party purchaser in
good faith, thereby promoting the security of transaction. 385 The result is
a comprehensive set of provisions governing the sale of goods belonging
to another that work together to provide a balance between the competing
interests. 386
Louisiana’s good faith purchaser doctrine is similar to the UCC bona
fide purchaser doctrine, except for one main difference. Louisiana law
contains a gap in the law for a situation in which a precarious possessor
subsequently sells the thing to a third party. If the Louisiana legislature
would enact a provision similar to the UCC’s entrustment doctrine,
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3310(B) (2021).
LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 330.
QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2A-305[A][7].
Id. § 2A-305[A][1].
Id. § 2A-305[A][2].
Id.
Id. § 2A-305[A][3].
Id.
Id.
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Louisiana would also have a comprehensive set of provisions governing
the sale of movables belonging to another. This set of provisions would
provide a proper balance between the security of ownership and the
security of transaction.
While Louisiana has adopted the UCC’s treatment of conditional sales
under UCC Article 9, Louisiana has departed in a significant way.
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3310(B) provides an exception to the UCC
rule that a seller in a conditional sale disguised as a lease may retain only
a security interest in the thing. 387 Louisiana law provides that if the seller
properly perfects the conditional sale, then the seller is allowed to retain
ownership of the goods, thereby demoting the purchaser from owner to
precarious possessor. 388
The Louisiana legislature enacted the good faith purchaser doctrine
“in an effort to re-align Louisiana law with modern civil law and the
Uniform Commercial Code.” 389 Thus, two important goals of enacting the
doctrine were to promote clarity in the law and uniformity of law across
state lines by aligning Louisiana law with the UCC. The good faith
purchaser doctrine accomplished these goals until Louisiana Civil Code
article 520 was repealed. The repeal of article 520 disposed of a rule
complementary to the laws of other 49 states and created confusion as to
which of the remaining provisions in Louisiana law covered the sale of
movable things by precarious possessors. To re-instill clarity in the law
and realign Louisiana law with the laws of the other states, the Louisiana
legislature needs to pass new legislation similar to the UCC’s entrustment
doctrine.
A. A Necessary First Step: Repeal La. R.S. § 9:3310(B)
First, the Louisiana legislature needs to repeal Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:3310(B). This provision of the Louisiana Lease of Movables
Act has artificially expanded the concept of precarious possession into
disguised conditional sales. 390 Even though Louisiana has adopted
Article 9 of the UCC, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3310(B) has caused
Louisiana law to depart from the UCC approach in the area of conditional
sales. 391 Only once this LMA provision is repealed can Louisiana fully
realign its laws surrounding precarious possession with the UCC.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3310(B) (2021).
Id.
Act No. 180, 1979 La. Acts 430.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3310(B) (2021).
LONEGRASS ET AL., supra note 2, at 330.
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B. A Second Step: New Legislation
Then, the Louisiana legislature should enact a Civil Code article
similar to the UCC’s entrustment doctrine in order to fill the gap in
Louisiana’s law left by the repeal of article 520. This legislation would
allow Louisiana law to clarify the confusion currently surrounding the sale
of movable things by a precarious possessor, while also promoting
uniformity of law across state lines by drawing its principles from the UCC
entrustment doctrine. Enacting this rule would complete Louisiana’s good
faith purchaser doctrine and lead to an ideal balance between the security
of transaction and the security of ownership.
In drafting the new Civil Code article, the Louisiana legislature must
consider not only the relationship between Louisiana law and the UCC,
but also the relationship between the UCC voidable-title rule and the UCC
entrustment doctrine. First, the legislature must examine the similarity
between the voidable-title and vice-of-consent rules under the UCC and
Louisiana law. Next, the legislature should look to the difference in
requirements for applications of the UCC voidable-title rule and the UCC
entrustment doctrine and consider the policy behind the differences.
Finally, the legislature should consider the text of repealed article 520 and
use the same policy reasons to justify the adoption of the UCC entrustment
doctrine requirements in Louisiana.
The Louisiana legislature should first consider the similarity between
the UCC’s voidable-title rule and Louisiana’s vice-of-consent rule. Recall
that Louisiana’s rule has two basic requirements: the buyer must (1) act in
good faith and (2) pay fair value. 392 The UCC voidable-title rule also has
two basic requirements: the buyer must (1) act in good faith and (2) pay
value. 393 Thus, Louisiana’s requirements are cohesive with the UCC.
Next, the Louisiana legislature should consider the difference in
requirements between the UCC voidable-title rule and its entrustment
doctrine. Recall that the UCC entrustment doctrine contains different
requirements than its voidable-title rule. The requirements under the UCC
entrustment doctrine include: (1) the entrusted seller must be a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind and (2) the buyer must be a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, which requires that the buyer (a) be in good
faith, (b) be without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
rights of others, and (c) buy in the ordinary course from a merchant in the
business of selling goods of that kind. 394 These requirements significantly
392. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 522 (2021).
393. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
394. Id. § 2-403(2).
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restrict the operation of the UCC entrustment doctrine to a narrower class
of purchasers than those protected by the UCC voidable-title rule. In fact,
an Official Comment to the UCC entrustment doctrine provides, “The
older loose concept of good faith and wide definition of value combined
to create apparent good faith purchasers in many situations in which the
result outraged common sense.” 395
A look to the policies underlying the UCC doctrines justifies the more
stringent requirements of the UCC entrustment doctrine. The UCC
voidable-title rule is resolved in favor of the good faith purchaser when
there is some intent on part of the original owner to pass title to the
subsequent seller. 396 Because the original owner had the intent to pass title,
the owner is subsequently limited in reclaiming ownership after title,
although voidable, had passed. 397 If the goods are still in the hands of the
original buyer, then the original owner would be able to reclaim the goods;
however, once the goods passed to a subsequent purchaser in good faith
and who paid fair value, the owner would not be able to reclaim the goods
from that subsequent purchaser. 398
In contrast, the UCC entrustment doctrine is applied when there is no
intent to pass title on the part of the original owner. 399 However, the
requirement that the intermediate seller qualify as a merchant dealing in
goods of that kind contemplates a risk assumed by the original owner. 400
When the original owner voluntarily delivers goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind, he assumes the risk that the merchant might
act beyond the scope of his authority and sell the goods to a third party. 401
The risk assumed by the original owner in a UCC entrustment situation is
a lower level of culpability on part of the original owner when compared
to the intent to pass title contemplated by the UCC voidable-title rule; thus,
the class of buyers protected under the UCC entrustment doctrine is
limited to buyers in the ordinary course of business. 402
Recall that repealed Louisiana Civil Code article 520 once provided,
“A transferee in good faith and for fair value acquires the ownership of a
corporeal movable, if the transferor, though not owner, has possession
395. Id. § 2-403(1) cmt.
396. Richard W. Duesenberg, Title: Risk of Loss and Third Parties, 30 MO. L.
REV. 191, 206 (1965).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. James L. Padgett, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-403(1): The
Authority of a Bailee to Convey Title, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 241, 244 (1968).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
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with the consent of the owner, as pledgee, lessee, depositary, or other
person of similar standing.” 403 Repealed article 520 contained two major
requirements: (1) good faith on the part of the purchaser and (2) fair value
paid by the purchaser. 404 These old requirements are identical to the
requirements of the voidable-title rules of Louisiana and the UCC.
However, for the same reasons set forth above, the seller in a precariouspossessor situation is less culpable than the seller in a voidable-title
situation. Therefore, Louisiana should opt to protect buyers (1) from a
precarious possessor who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind and
(2) only when the buyer qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business.
In drafting this legislation, repealed article 520 is a good place to start.
From there, language should be modified, omitted, and added. First, the
language “has possession with consent of the owner” is the definition of
precarious possession; thus, the language “as pledgee, lessee depositary,
or other person of similar standing” is superfluous and can be omitted. 405
Next, the article should include the requirement that the precarious
possessor is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind. The article can
approach this requirement by adding the language “merchant customarily
selling similar things,” as is done in Louisiana Civil Code article 524, to
the code article and defining the term in a comment, as is done in article
2601. 406
Additionally, the article should include the requirement that the buyer
qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Recall that the
entrustment doctrine defines this requirement as a buyer who (a) is in good
faith, (b) is without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
rights of others, and (c) buys in the ordinary course from a merchant in the
403. Act No. 180, 1979 La. Acts 430.
404. Id.
405. In fact, the Louisiana Civil Code already defines precarious possession.
“The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of
the owner or possessor is precarious possession.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3437
(2021).
406. Article 2601 provides in part, “Between merchants, however, additional
terms become part of the contract unless . . . .” Id. art. 2601. Comment (h) to this
article provides,
Under this Article, a party to a contract of sale is regarded as a merchant
when he habitually manufactures, or buys and sells things of the kind
involved in the contract. A merchant, however, may be regarded as a
consumer when purchasing things of a kind different from those he
manufactures, or buys and sells.
Id. art. 2601 cmt. h.
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business of selling goods of that kind. 407 Louisiana law defines good faith
in Louisiana Civil Code article 523, which provides, “An acquirer of a
corporeal movable is in good faith for purposes of this Chapter unless he
knows or should have known, that the transferor was not the owner.” 408
Louisiana’s rule is broader than the good faith contemplated by parts (a)
and (b) of the UCC’s requirement. The UCC does not deem someone who
should have known that the transferor was not the owner to be in bad faith;
the UCC only takes away status of good faith when the purchaser did know
that the transferor was not the owner. This new article should comport with
the definition of good faith as it currently exists with respect to the other
provisions of Louisiana’s good faith purchaser doctrine, rather than
adopting a new and differing definition of good faith. Thus, the article
should clarify that Louisiana’s definition of good faith is narrower than the
UCC by acknowledging this distinction. Finally, the article should
incorporate the UCC’s requirement of buying in the ordinary course. The
requirement that the buyer purchases in the ordinary course can be
approximated according to the UCC’s definition, which has been adopted
by the Louisiana legislature in the context of conditional sales. 409
With all of the above considerations taken into account, the Louisiana
legislature should enact the following provision in the Louisiana Civil
Code:
A transferee in good faith and for fair value acquires ownership of
a corporeal movable if two conditions are met. First, the transferor
must be a merchant who has possession with the consent of the
owner. Second, the sale must comport with the usual or customary
practices in the kind of business in which the transferor is
engaged. For purposes of this article, a transferee is not in good
faith when he should have known that the transferor was not the
owner.
A comment to the article should state, “Under this Article, a party to a
contract of sale is regarded as a merchant when he habitually manufactures
or buys and sells things of the kind involved in the sale.” Another comment
should state, “This Article accords with Section 2-403(2) of the Uniform
407. QUINN, supra note 289, at § 2-403[A][5].
408. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 523 (2021).
409. Recall that the UCC clarifies that “[a] person buys goods in the ordinary
course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in
the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller's own usual
or customary practices.” U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N
2021).
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Commercial Code,” just as the other articles of Louisiana’s good faith
purchaser doctrine include references to the UCC.
CONCLUSION
The effect of enacting a revised version of Louisiana Civil Code article
520 and repealing Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3310(B) is twofold.
First, the Louisiana legislature will realign Louisiana with the law of the
other U.S. jurisdictions in the sale of movables, thereby promoting
stability of commerce across state lines. Second, the Louisiana legislature
will simultaneously, albeit surprisingly, bring Louisiana back to its civil
law roots: the new legislation would promote the French maxim en fait de
meubles, la possession vaut titre. Be that as it may, if the Louisiana
legislature does not act, Louisiana courts and practitioners will be left with
stagnant principles that further evolved at common law and that do not
align with Louisiana’s civil law roots.
In the ring hypothetical presented at the outset of this Comment, the
question posed was whether A, the actual owner of the ring, or C, the good
faith purchaser of the ring, should be protected under the law and awarded
ownership of the ring. Under the proposed solution, C would be awarded
ownership of the ring only if (1) B was a merchant who customarily sells
similar things, (2) C was in good faith and paid fair value, and (3) the sale
occurred in the ordinary course of business. If C failed to meet any of these
requirements, A would retain the ownership of the ring, and C would be
limited to recovering damages from B.

